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INSURANCE COVERAGE SETTLEMENTS AND
THE RIGHTS OF EXCESS INSURERS
JOHN F. O'CONNOR*
INTRODUCTION
Several years ago, professional football coach Bill Parcells fa-
mously complained about his job situation in the following way: "A
friend told me if you're going to cook the meal, they ought to let you
shop for the groceries."1 Parcells meant that he was burdened with
high expectations to make his football team successful, and it was un-
fair to place his fate as a coach largely in the hands of some general
manager who had the authority to shop for the players that Parcells
would be required to coach.
In the slightly less violent world of complex insurance coverage
litigation, we often see policyholders attempting to do exactly the
same thing to their excess liability insurers.2 Policyholders frequently
argue that an excess insurer's coverage obligations actually can in-
crease as a result of the policyholder's voluntary decision to settle its
coverage disputes with primary or lower-level excess insurers, even
though the excess insurer has no role in these settlements.3 The poli-
cyholder in effect argues that the nonsettling excess insurer's fate is in
the hands of third parties, who have absolutely no incentive to re-
present the excess insurer's interests in settlement negotiations.4 In
response, excess insurers frequently argue that the risk of a bad settle-
* Associate, Steptoe &Johnson LLP. B.A., University of Rochester; M.S.Sc., Syracuse
University; J.D., University of Maryland School of Law. Mr. O'Connor regularly represents
insurance companies in complex insurance coverage disputes. The opinions expressed in
this Article are those of the author only and do not reflect the opinions of Steptoe &
Johnson LLP or its clients. The author would like to thank Roger Warin and Harry Lee of
Steptoe & Johnson LLP for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
1. Ara Najarian, Parcells Would Rather Coach No One in '97: He Chooses Not To Renew
Contract with Patriots, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1997, at Cl, available at 1997 WL 2178387.
2. See, e.g., Chem. Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 177 F.3d 210, 228
(3d Cir. 1999) (describing the public policy argument against allowing a policyholder to
recover more from all its insurers than its actual loss).
3. See, e.g., Koppers Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 98 F.3d 1440, 1443 (3d Cir. 1996)
(describing the trial court's ruling that excess insurers are liable for the full amount of a
claim without accounting for the plaintiffs pre-trial settlements with other liability
insurers).
4. See Michael M. Marick, Excess Insurance: An Overview of General Principles and Current
Issues, 24 TORT & INS. L.J. 715, 749 (1989) (noting that "the primary carrier may not in its
claims handling adequately protect the excess insurer's interests").
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ment between a policyholder and its underlying insurers should stay
with the parties to the settlement agreement and not be foisted upon
the excess insurer.5 An understanding of this issue requires a brief
primer on the nature of general liability insurance.
General liability insurance typically is issued to a policyholder in a
series of layers, by a series of different insurers.6 A Fortune 500 com-
pany might have twenty or more general liability policies in effect for
a given year, providing hundreds of millions of dollars of coverage.7
For a given policy period, the policyholder's policies will apply in a
serial order to claims triggering coverage for that policy period.' The
first policy to respond is the policyholder's primary policy.9 After the
primary policy has paid its limit(s), the excess policies apply to cov-
ered claims in a predetermined order.1 ° Usually, excess policies are
written to apply "excess" to the coverage provided by the primary pol-
icy and any underlying excess policies." Disputes often arise, how-
5. See id. at 735-36 (discussing settlements for less than the primary or underlying
policy limits and selected court decisions supporting the position of excess insurers); Scott
M. Seaman & Charlene Kittredge, Excess Liability Insurance: Law and Litigation, 32 TORT &
INS. L.J. 653, 703 (1997) (asserting that "the excess insurer may seek to hold the primary
insurer liable for the excess verdict").
6. BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HAINDBOOK ON INSURANCE COVERAGE
DISPUTES § 6.03[a], at 293 (10th ed. 2000); see also Kenneth S. Abraham, The Maze of Mega-
Coverage Litigation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2102, 2106 (1997) (explaining that "[Commercial
General Liability] policyholders typically were (and are today) covered by both primary
and multiple 'layers' of excess liability insurance each year"). See generally Marick, supra
note 4, at 716-19 (describing the practice of purchasing multiple layers of liability insur-
ance and addressing the difference between "primary insurance," "self-insurance," and "ex-
cess insurance").
7. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY INSURANCE LAW 223 (1991) (ex-
plaining that many of America's largest companies have excess insurance policies that pro-
vide liability insurance worth several hundred million dollars).
8. Marick, supra note 4, at 731 (stating that an excess insurer's duty to indemnify
typically attaches only when an insured generates liability in excess of any underlying
policies).
9. See OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 6, § 6.03[a], at 292 (explaining that "[p] rimary
insurance is coverage that attached immediately upon the happening of an occurrence
that is covered under the terms of the policy"); Marick, supra note 4, at 716 (describing
coverage under a primary insurance policy "as coverage 'whereby, under the terms of the
policy, liability attaches immediately upon the happening of the occurrence that gives rise
to liability"' (quoting Whitehead v. Fleet Towing Co., 442 N.E.2d 1362, 1366 (Ill. App. Ct.
1982))).
10. Marick, supra note 4, at 717.
11. OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 6, § 13.01 [a], at 767 (stating that "excess insurers
frequently agree to provide coverage to an insured in excess of agreed types and amounts
of underlying insurance, without having seen.., the underlying policies or, in many cases,
without even knowing the name of the underlying insur[er], leaving such matters 'to be
advised' ").
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ever, as to when one insurer's coverage obligation ends and another
insurer's coverage obligation begins.' 2
In some cases, determining when an excess insurance policy ap-
plies is simple. If a court finds, or the parties all agree, that the under-
lying policies must pay the policyholder's first $5 million of liability,
and that they are then exhausted, a policy applying excess of the un-
derlying policies has a duty to pay once the policyholder's covered
liability exceeds $5 million. In complex insurance coverage litigation,
however, the facts and the law are almost never so clear. General lia-
bility policies typically are written with an "aggregate limit," which
states the total amount the insurer will pay for certain types of claims,
no matter how many claims are asserted against the policyholder.13
However, such policies often are written so that the aggregate limits
apply only to certain hazards, with the aggregate limit not applying to
other types of claims covered by the policy.14 As a result, the parties
frequently dispute whether the policies' aggregate limits apply to the
particular types of claims for which the policyholder seeks coverage.
1 5
A primary insurer or lower-level excess insurer might argue that its
available limits of liability have exhausted, meaning that responsibility
for the claims at issue rests with either a higher-level insurer or (if
there is no higher-level insurer) with the policyholder itself.'6 Con-
versely, excess insurers often argue that they have no coverage obliga-
tion because the underlying coverage is not exhausted, meaning that
12. Thomas M. Bower, Partial Settlements By Primary Insurers: The Law, 29 TORT & INS.
L.J. 536, 536 (1994).
13. See Ronald E. Mallen & David W. Evans, Surviving the Directors' and Officers' Liability
Crisis: Insurance and the Alternatives, 12 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 439, 449 (1987) (explaining that
'the aggregate limit is usually defined as the total limits available for all claims [out of the
same type of occurrence] made within the policy year").
14. For example, one commonly used provision in post-1973 general liability policies
provides as follows: "[T] he total liability of the company for all damages because of (1) all
bodily injury included within the completed operations hazard and (2) all bodily injury
liability included within the products hazard shall not exceed the limit of bodily injury
liability insurance stated in the [declarations] as 'aggregate."' ABRA AM, supra note 7, at
292 (reproducing a 1973 comprehensive general liability insurance policy form originally
produced by Insurance Services Offices, Inc.) (footnote omitted).
15. See, e.g., Brazas Sporting Arms, Inc. v. Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 220 F.3d
1, 6 (1st Cir. 2000) (resolving a dispute about the applicability of policy aggregate limits by
holding that such limits applied to gun liability suits against the policyholder).
16. See, e.g., Fibreboard Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 376,
380 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (affirming the trial court's ruling that the insurer had no further
coverage obligations for the policyholder's asbestos liabilities because the insurer had ex-
hausted the limits of all coverage available under the policies at issue).
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responsibility for the claims rests with the lower-level insurer whose
coverage has not yet exhausted.' 7
The analysis of which an insurer within a given policy period, if
any, has a responsibility to respond to claims against the policyholder
often is further complicated by the policyholder's settlement with,
and release of, some of its insurers. 8 For example, imagine the situa-
tion where a primary insurer and its policyholder dispute whether an
exclusion bars coverage for a series of claims tendered by the policy-
holder. If the exclusion applies, the primary insurer pays nothing. If
the exclusion does not apply, the primary insurer is liable for its full
$5 million policy limit. In such a situation, the parties might settle for
$3 million in recognition that the dispute over the exclusion might go
either way in court. One thing is certain: the settling insurer's actual
policy obligation does not equal the $3 million settlement payment; it
is either zero or it is $5 million. What effect does such a settlement
have on the obligations of an insurer that provided coverage "excess"
to the settled primary policy?19 Must the excess insurer pay the
amount of the policyholder's liability exceeding $3 million?2" Does
the court determine the excess insurer's obligation by determining
whether the primary insurer's settlement was reasonable?2 Or is the
excess insurer entitled to ajudicial determination of what the primary
insurer's liability would have been in the absence of a settlement, with
the excess insurer liable only to the extent that the policyholder's cov-
ered liability exceeds that judicially-determined amount?
Although these issues arise in practically every complex insurance
coverage dispute,22 there are remarkably few decisions addressing the
manner in which the settlement of underlying policies affects the obli-
17. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Dana Corp., 759 N.E.2d 1049, 1063 (Ind. 2001) (recog-
nizing that the excess insurer has no obligation if the coverage available under an underly-
ing policy is not exhausted); see also Seaman & Kittredge, supra note 5, at 672 (stating that
"excess insurance contracts do not respond to losses unless and until there has been full
and proper exhaustion of primary insurance, SIRs, and underlying excess insurance").
18. See Bower, supra note 12, at 537 (stating that issues occur "when a primary insurer
settles part of a claim by paying less than its full policy").
19. See id. (asking whether a "partial settlement constitute[s] 'exhaustion' of the pri-
mary limit sufficient to trigger the excess carrier's policy").
20. Id.
21. Id. at 538 (noting that many cases deal with "whether a partial settlement of a claim
for less than the primary carrier's limit may constitute 'exhaustion' of that limit, at least for
the purpose of triggering an excess insurer's indemnity obligation").
22. See Seaman & Kittredge, supra note 5, at 673-74 (discussing the multitude of issues




gations of excess insurers.2 3 In addition, there is little scholarly treat-
ment of this subject.24 This Article will analyze the manner in which
courts have dealt, and should deal, with the thorny issues that arise
when a policyholder settles with some of its liability insurers and then
seeks additional coverage from insurers whose policies apply excess of
the settled coverage. In particular, this Article will focus on situations
where one or more excess insurers contends that an underlying in-
surer settled for less than its actual policy limits, and how courts have
determined who must cover the gap in coverage between what an un-
derlying insurer actually owed under its policy and the amount it paid
in settlement.25 Finally, this Article will explain why most courts cor-
rectly have held that a policyholder must fill any gap in coverage
caused by its below-limits settlements, thereby precluding a policy-
holder and its lower-level insurers from adversely affecting a nonset-
tling excess insurer's coverage obligations through their own
settlement.
2 6
23. Cf Maick, supra note 4, at 750 (noting that "[a]lthough there once was a relative
dearth of case law addressing the role of the excess insurer in litigation against the insured,
principles of law have begun to develop").
24. See Abraham, supra note 6, at 2102 (explaining that litigation between policyhold-
ers and insurers receives less scholarly attention than the claim against the policyholder
that generated the initial liability).
25. A similar situation arises where a settling insurer arguably paid more than its actual
policy limits in settling a coverage dispute with its policyholder. In that situation, the issue
is whether the excess insurers are required to pay amounts over the settled carrier's actual
policy limits, or only amounts in excess of the settled carrier's settlement payment. The
issue of an above-limits settlement has its own set of unique public policy concerns, not the
least of which is whether a policyholder can be permitted, in essence, to make a profit
through its commission of torts by successfully negotiating above-limits settlements with
some of its liability insurers. See Chem. Leaman Tank Lines v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 177
F.3d 210, 228-29 (3d Cir. 1999); Koppers Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 98 F.3d 1440, 1452
(3d Cir. 1996); United Techs. Corp. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 118 F. Supp. 2d 190, 200
(D. Conn. 2000); Gerrish Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 949 F. Supp. 236, 242 (D. Vt.
1996) (recognizing that public policy concerns are appropriately met when a policyholder
is not permitted to reap a double recovery whereby it recovers more from its insurers than
the amount of the loss it has suffered). Because below-limits settlements are more often
the issue in complex insurance coverage litigation, and because above-limits settlements
implicate a separate set of public policy concerns, the proper treatment of above-limits
settlements is beyond the scope of this Article.
26. A similar issue can arise in those jurisdictions where consecutive insurers are held
jointly and severally liable for indivisible bodily injury or property damage claims taking
place over multiple policy periods. For example, if indivisible environmental contamina-
tion takes place continuously from 1960 to 1980, some jurisdictions have held that such a
loss renders each triggered insurer jointly and severally liable for the entire loss. The poli-
cyholder selects an insurer to pay the entire loss, subject to the selected insurer's policy
limits, with the selected insurer permitted to seek contribution from the other triggered
insurers. See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1047-50 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (holding that each insurer of a policyholder that caused an indivisible loss is jointly
and severally responsible for covering that loss). In such a situation, the policyholder
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Part I of this Article will explore the factual backdrop against
which a policyholder's below-limits settlement with one or more of its
insurers takes place. Essentially, it is a function of the structure of the
general liability insurance program typical of any large manufacturer,
contractor, or other business, with multiple policies issued by multiple
insurers in every policy period.27 When coverage defenses and dis-
putes about the applicability of policy limits are added to the mix, a
policyholder may reasonably determine that it makes good business
sense to settle its coverage claims against some of its insurers, while
continuing to pursue coverage from its remaining insurers. As in any
compromise, such settlements frequently require the policyholder to
accept less in settlement than it might have obtained had it prevailed
at trial.28 When the policyholder decides to settle with some, but not
all, of its insurers, the proper treatment of such settlements as it re-
lates to the nonsettling insurers is a necessary issue that must be re-
solved by the court.
Part II of this Article will address the relatively commonplace situ-
ation where a policyholder settles with an insurer for an amount that
is less than the insurer's actual policy obligations. For the most part,
courts correctly have held that a policyholder settling a policy for less
than its actual limits is liable for any gap in coverage between the set-
tled policy limits and the amount received from the settled carrier.29
Policyholders sometimes argue, however, that such a rule should not
apply in so-called "modern" coverage litigation, where a policyholder
settling its disputes with some of its insurers might have difficulty de-
might settle with the carriers on the risk from 1960 to 1970, while continuing to seek
coverage from the carriers on the risk from 1971 to 1980. Courts generally have held that
where the policyholder has settled with and released insurers that were jointly and severally
liable with the nonsettling insurers, the amount that the policyholder may recover from
the nonsettling insurers must be offset by the settling insurers' equitable share of the loss.
See, e.g., Gould, Inc. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 585 A.2d 16, 19 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991). While this
Article is concerned with the effect, if any, that settlements by underlying insurers have on
the obligations of excess insurers issuing policies for the same policy period, and the ap-
portioned share set-off rule discussed in Gould and other cases concerns settlements by
jointly and severally liable insurers, the rationales underlying the majority rule in both
situations are the same. In either situation, courts generally have held that one insurer's
settlement cannot increase the ultimate coverage obligations of a nonsettling insurer, and
that the policyholder must pay any gaps in coverage caused by its below-limits settlement of
triggered policies. Id. By placing the risk of a below-limits settlement on the policyholder,
courts allow settling insurers to obtain the finality for which they bargained, while prevent-
ing the policyholder's decision to settle with certain of its insurers from negatively affecting
the coverage obligations of nonsettling insurers.
27. Marick, supra note 4, at 715.
28. See id. at 735 (discussing the practice of entering into settlements for less than
primary policy limits).
29. See, e.g., Koppers, 98 F.3d at 1454.
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termining at the time of settlement whether it is settling for less than
the actual limits of the settling insurers' policies. 3° This argument
notwithstanding, courts have more or less uniformly applied the same
rule in "modern" coverage cases that they have applied for decades,
ruling that a policyholder's settlement with an underlying insurer can-
not negatively affect the obligations of a nonsettling excess insurer.3 '
While Part II demonstrates that courts have not required nonset-
ling excess insurers to fill gaps in coverage caused by the policy-
holder's below-limits settlements, Part III analyzes the factual
underpinnings of this rule and explains why this rule makes sense. As
Part III demonstrates, a rule requiring an excess insurer to fill gaps in
coverage caused by underlying insurers' below-limits settlements in ef-
fect transfers obligations from the policyholder and the settling insur-
ers to the nonsettling excess insurer.3 2 By requiring a policyholder to
fill any gaps in coverage caused by its below-limits settlements with
underlying insurers, courts sensibly have allocated the risk of the poli-
cyholder's settlement to the policyholder instead of to an excess in-
surer that is a stranger to the underlying settlement agreements.
I. THE FACTUAL UNDERPINNINGS OF A BELOW-LIMITS SETTLEMENT
A. The Structure of the Typical General Liability Insurance Program
The business of general liability insurance is predicated on the
notion of spreading risks.33 One of the reasons why businesses
purchase general liability insurance is to exchange the unknown risk
of future legal liabilities for the fixed, known cost of an annual insur-
ance premium.3 4 For example, a company that knows there is a one
percent chance of having a catastrophic, business-threatening loss
during a year has an economic incentive to pay an annual liability
insurance premium instead of rolling the dice that it will not have
such a loss, knowing that a catastrophic uninsured loss might threaten
its ability to remain in business.35
30. See Seaman & Kittredge, supra note 5, at 707 (stating that it is "increasingly difficult
to evaluate claims promptly" and that there is "difficulty in evaluating the value of the
underlying claims").
31. E.g., Gould, 585 A.2d at 19.
32. Zeig v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 23 F.2d 665, 666 (2d Cir. 1928).
33. ABRAAM", supra note 7, at 15.
34. See id. (noting that businesses "prefer to pay an insurance premium in order to
transfer to a third-party the risk of suffering a large loss, even when the actuarial value of
that loss (the probability that the loss will occur multiplied by its expected magnitude if it




Insurance companies similarly are in the business of spreading
the risks they insure. While an insurance company might issue bil-
lions of dollars in coverage each year, that coverage will be spread
among many different policyholders. The economic rationale for
such a practice is that by spreading its exposure among many different
policyholders, the insurance company avoids the risk that a single cat-
astrophic loss by one of its policyholders will render the insurer insol-
vent.36 Thus, an insurance company will spread its risk by issuing
coverage in relatively small amounts to a large number of policyhold-
ers. 7 Such a business model also benefits policyholders for the sim-
ple reason that it helps avoid a situation in which an insurer becomes
insolvent and is unable to pay claims submitted by its other
policyholders."8
While insurance companies avoid the risk of a catastrophic loss by
issuing policies with moderate limits of liability, large businesses still
have a need for large amounts of insurance coverage each year.3" For
example, a large manufacturer might purchase liability insurance ex-
tending into the hundreds of millions of dollars in policy limits each
year.4° In order to obtain such high limits of annual liability insur-
ance, businesses typically purchase general liability insurance in layers.
For each year, the policyholder will purchase a primary policy, which
usually has a reasonably low limit of liability (usually no more than a
few million dollars in policy limits).4 The primary policy pays cov-
ered claims until its limits of liability are exhausted, with the policy-
36. See JOHN F. DOBBYN, INSURANCE LAW IN A NUTSHELL 4 (1981) (stating that the law of
averages helps to minimize the risk to the insurer when a large number of policies are
involved).
37. SeeARAHAM, supra note 7, at 15 (explaining that "[t]he insurer makes a profit by
pooling a large number of such risks and suffering an average loss per insured of only
$100").
38. Insurers further spread the risk by reinsuring the policies they issue to many differ-
ent insurers, thereby spreading the financial consequences of a covered loss among many
insurers. See id. at 223. Reinsurance occurs when a primary or excess insurer transfers
some or all of the risk in a policy to another insurer. Id.
39. See ABRAHAM, supra note 7, at 15 (noting that many large corporations, or their
creditors, are risk-averse, and thus purchase insurance "against catastrophically large losses
resulting from utterly unexpected events or radical legal change that could bankrupt or
severely impede the functioning of the corporation").
40. Id. at 223 (noting that large companies often purchase hundreds of millions of
dollars in general liability insurance each year).
41. See id. (explaining that the first "layer" of large business insurance coverage is a
primary insurance policy); Seaman & Kittredge, supra note 5, at 655 (describing the obliga-




holder possibly being liable for a deductible or self-insured
retention.4 2
In addition to purchasing primary insurance, businesses that de-
sire more coverage than the limits typically available under primary
policies must purchase excess insurance.43 Excess insurance is issued
in layers corresponding to the policy's attachment point.4 4 In the
usual coverage profile, the lowest-level excess insurer agrees to pay the
first dollar of claims for which the primary policy is exhausted,45 and
to keep paying claims until its own limits of liability are exhausted.46
Like primary policies, however, an excess insurer's obligations might
be subject to a deductible or self-insured retention, by which the poli-
cyholder remains liable to pay a portion of each claim or occurrence,
or to pay a fixed dollar amount, before the excess insurer's obligations
begin.4 At that point, the next lowest-layer excess policy begins pay-
ing claims for which the primary policy and lowest-layer excess policy
are exhausted, and pays until its policy limits are exhausted.4" This
sequential march up the coverage chart continues until either the pol-
icyholder runs out of covered claims or the policyholder runs out of
insurance coverage for its claims.4"
42. Marick, supra note 4, at 716.
43. Id. at 717 (stating, "excess insurance is the next 'layer' or 'level' of coverage above
the primary policy or the insured's self-insured retention").
44. See Seaman & Kittredge, supra note 5, at 656 (describing the role of the excess
insurer and stating that excess insurers generally indemnify the policyholder for sums in
excess of underlying coverage and the excess insurer's liability is most often, by contract, to
be fixed by a judgment or settlement agreement).
45. Marick, supra note 4, at 717.
46. ABRAHAM, supra note 7, at 225.
47. See id. at 16 (stating that many large corporations purchase policies with high de-
ductibles); Marick, supra note 4, at 717 (explaining that self-insurance essentially performs
the same function as a deductible).
48. See, e.g., Koppers Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 98 F.3d 1440, 1454 (3d Cir. 1996)
(observing that "a true excess or secondary policy is not 'triggered' or required to pay until
the underlying primary coverage has been exhausted"). See also Marick, supra note 4, at
731 (explaining that "[b]y definition, excess insurers generally are liable only for the
amount of loss or damage in excess of underlying coverage"). Of course, liability insur-
ance is a matter of private contract, and the parties are free to structure excess coverage so
that it is triggered when the policyholder's liability exceeds an agreed-upon dollar level,
without tying coverage to the exhaustion of the underlying coverage. See id. at 717 (noting
the contractual nature of insurance policies). The disadvantage to such an approach is
that it can leave gaps in coverage if the excess insurance is triggered at an attachment point
greater than the limits of the underlying coverage. See, e.g., Soc'y of the Roman Catholic
Church of the Diocese of Lafayette, Inc. v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 126 F.3d 727, 732
(5th Cir. 1997) (explaining that a gap in coverage existed because the excess coverage was
not written to apply upon exhaustion of the policyholder's underlying coverage).
49. Seaman & Kittredge, supra note 5, at 656.
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Thus, the insurance coverage profile of even a moderately-sized
business looks something like a grid or a stack of blocks. In any given
year, the policyholder will have a primary insurance policy or self-
insured retention, with excess insurance policies providing coverage
once the primary policy or self-insured retention is exhausted. 50 To
the left and the right, the policyholder will have a similar succession of
primary and excess insurance policies covering other policy years.51
Indeed, in order to avoid gaps in coverage caused by differences in
policy language, many excess insurance policies are "following form"
policies,52 whereby the insurer, subject to certain limitations, agrees to
provide the same coverage as an underlying policy issued for the same
policy period.5 ' Following form policies can be exceedingly short
(sometimes just a page or two) because the actual terms, conditions,
and exclusions governing coverage under the policy are previously set
out in the underlying policy.54
One important aspect of excess insurance is the attachment point.
The attachment point is the amount in covered claims that must be
paid by underlying primary and excess insurers before the insurer's
obligation to pay arises.55 For example, a policy that is excess of a $2
million primary policy and a $5 million lower-level excess policy has
an attachment point of $7 million for claims to which the policy limits
of the underlying policies apply. The attachment point not only es-
tablishes which insurer has a duty to pay a covered claim, but also
50. See ABRAHAM, supra note 7, at 223-24 (discussing the multi-layered nature of busi-
ness insurance).
51. Id.
52. Frequently, excess insurers agree to provide an insured with an excess policy that
"follows form" or mirrors the language of the underlying policy. ABRAHAM, supra note 7, at
225; OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 6, § 13.01; Marick, supra note 4, at 718. Sometimes
excess insurance happens "by coincidence" when several primary policies apply to the
same liability. Seaman & Kittredge, supra note 5, at 657 (citing Rhone-Poulenc, Inc. v. Int'l
Ins. Co., 71 F.3d 1299 (7th Cir. 1995)).
53. A typical "following form" excess insurance clause may read:
The provisions of the immediate underlying policy are incorporated as part of
this policy except for any obligation to investigate and defend and pay for costs
and expenses incident to any of the same, the amounts of the limits of liability,
any "other insurance" provision and any other provisions therein which are in-
consistent with this policy.
Marick, supra note 4, at 718.
54. See ABRAHAM, supra note 7, at 225 (explaining that "[m]any excess policies ...
simply state that their terms are identical to those in the underlying primary policy, with
the exception of their limits of liability").
55. See Household Int'l, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 749 N.E.2d 1, 12 (Ill. App. Ct.
2001) (illustrating that "an excess policy with an 'attachment point' of $51 million in ex-
cess of underlying coverage will not be implicated until the insured has exhausted $51
million in lower-level coverage").
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greatly affects policy premiums.56 A $1 million policy that is excess to
$25 million in limits will be significantly cheaper than a $1 million
policy, covering the same perils, that is excess of only $5 million.17
One of the reasons why the higher-layer policy is less expensive per
dollar of coverage provided, than the lower-layer policy is that there is
a reasonable possibility that the policy excess of $5 million will be trig-
gered to pay claims while the higher-level policy pays nothing.58 For
example, if a policyholder suffers $10 million in covered liabilities,
and all of the liabilities are subject to the policy limits, the policy ex-
cess of $5 million must pay its entire $1 million policy limit, but the
policy excess of $25 million is never touched.
As stated above, the multiple insurance policies in effect for a
given year respond to covered claims in an explicit, sequential order.
Once the primary policy exhausts its applicable policy limit(s) for a
covered claim or type of covered claim, the first-layer excess policy, or
"umbrella" policy,59 must respond.6 ° Once the umbrella policy has
exhausted its applicable policy limits, the next lowest excess policy re-
sponds, and so on. The difficulty in complex insurance coverage liti-
gation often is determining which limit(s) apply to the claims.6 The
typical general liability policy has two types of policy limits, a per occur-
rence limit62 and an aggregate limit.6 3 The per occurrence limit estab-
lishes how much the insurer will pay for all claims arising out of a
56. See Thomas M. Bower, Some Unforeseen Issues Arising from the Mid-Term Cancellation of
an Excess Policy, MEALEY's LITIc. REP.: INS., Sept. 6, 2000, at 21 (noting that higher "layer"
excess policies result in lower premium rates per dollar of coverage).
57. See id. Bower notes:
Barring some legal catastrophe.., an upper excess layer insurer may never even
have to open a claim file, even if the primary and lower excess layers defend and
pay numerous claims. This difference in the risk confronted by successive layers
of insurance is normally reflected in the relative cost of each policy: the higher
one goes in the layering, the lower the premium rate per dollar of coverage.
Id.
58. Marick, supra note 4, at 715.
59. Umbrella policies usually provide two types of coverage: following form excess cov-
erage and coverage that complements the primary policy by providing broader protection
than the primary policy. Id. at 718.
60. See Seamen & Kittredge, supra note 5, at 672 (explaining that "excess insurance
contracts do not respond to losses unless and until there has been full and proper exhaus-
tion of primary insurance, SIRs, and underlying excess insurance").
61. Abraham, supra note 6, at 2106.
62. See OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 6, § 9.02, at 485 (providing that "there is one
set of per-occurrence policy limits available for damages during a policy year arising out of
each occurrence"); Seaman & Kittredge, supra note 5, at 673 (stating that "[m]ost occur-
rence-based contracts provide coverage for personal injury, bodily injury, and/or property
damage that takes place during the policy period").
63. See supra note 13 (defining "aggregate limit").
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single occurrence. "Occurrence" typically is a defined term in general
liability policies, and often is defined in terms similar to the following:
"[A] n accident, including injurious exposure to conditions, which re-
sults, during the policy period, in bodily injury or property damage
neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the
policyholder."64
While this concept seems simple enough in theory, the case re-
porters contain innumerable decisions in which courts were required
to resolve disputes as to the number of occurrences involved in a se-
ries of claims against a policyholder. Take, for example, the case of an
asbestos manufacturer sued for causing thousands of claimants to suf-
fer asbestos-related diseases as a result of exposure to the manufac-
turer's products. Some courts have held that all of the underlying
asbestos claims arise out of a single occurrence-the policyholder's
decision to become involved with asbestos-containing products65-
while other courts have held that the relevant occurrence is each
claimant's exposure to the policyholder's asbestos-containing prod-
ucts.6 6 Thus, the number of occurrences involved in asbestos-related
claims against a single policyholder might range from a finding of one
occurrence to a finding that the claims arise out of tens of thousands
of occurrences.
67
64. Rebecca M. Bratspies, Splitting the Baby: Apportioning Environmental Liability Among
Triggered Insurance Policies, 1999 BYU L. REv. 1215, 1222 (quoting John J. Tarpey, The New
Comprehensive Policy: Some of the Changes, 33 L. CouNs. J. 223, 234 (1966)).
65. Int'l Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Certain Underwriters & Underwriting Syndicates, 868
F. Supp. 917, 922 (S.D. Ohio 1994); Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. N. River Ins. Co., 762 F. Supp.
566, 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 4 F.3d 1049 (2d Cir. 1993); Colt Indus., Inc.
v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., No. 87-4107, 1989 WL 147615, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 6, 1989); Air
Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 707 F. Supp. 762, 773 (E.D. Pa.
1989), vacated in part on other grounds, 25 F.3d 177 (3d Cir. 1994); Owens-Illinois, Inc. v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 597 F. Supp. 1515, 1527 (D.D.C. 1984); Owens-Illinois, Inc. v.
United Ins. Co., 625 A.2d 1, 23 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993), rev'd in part on other
grounds, 650 A.2d 974 (N.J. 1994); Morton Thiokol, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., No. A-
8603799, slip op. at 1 (Ohio Ct. Comm. Pleas Dec. 28, 1988) (copy on file with author),
rev'd on other grounds per curiam, No. C-900283, 1991 WL 201651 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 2,
1991).
66. Dicola v. Am. S.S. Owners Mut. Prot. & Indem. Ass'n (In re Prudential Lines, Inc.),
158 F.3d 65, 81 (2d Cir. 1998); Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Arkwright-Boston Mfg. Mut. Ins.
Co., 53 F.3d 762, 767-68 (6th Cir. 1995); Pittsburgh Corning Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co.,
No. 84-3985, 1988 WL 5302, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 21, 1988); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 765 A.2d 891, 896 (Conn. 2001); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Porter
Hayden Co., 698 A.2d 1167, 1211 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997).
67. See Seaman & Kittredge, supra note 5, at 694 (discussing courts' divergent views as
to whether claims arise out of a single or multiple occurrence in the context of asbestos-
related claims).
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In addition to a per occurrence policy limit, most general liability
policies also have an aggregate limit of coverage.68 Aggregate limits
typically apply to cap the insurer's obligations for certain types of
claims no matter how many occurrences are involved. 69 Thus, a poli-
cyholder could face ten thousand claims, arising out of ten thousand
separate occurrences, and the insurer's exposure still will be limited
to the policy aggregate so long as that aggregate limit applies to the
category of claims involved. Disputes over the interplay, and applica-
bility, of per occurrence limits and aggregate limits can lead a policy-
holder and its insurer to have widely divergent views as to the amount
of coverage available under the policy. 0 When a policyholder and its
insurer have such divergent views as to the total amount of coverage
available, any subsequent settlement of the parties' coverage disputes
likely will involve a settlement payment somewhere between the par-
ties' litigation positions and can be significantly less than or signifi-
cantly more than the policy obligations that would be adjudged if the
dispute were resolved by a court.
B. How Below-Limits Settlements Occur
Why would a policyholder ever settle a claim against one of its
insurers for less than the insurer's actual policy obligations? While
such a course of action seems foolish at first blush, there are many
reasons why a policyholder might rationally settle with and release an
insurer for less than the amount the policyholder would have recov-
ered had the dispute proceeded to a litigated result.
1. Disputes Over the Existence of Coverage.-Fundamentally, a poli-
cyholder and its insurer might dispute whether a particular claim is
68. See Unigard Sec. Ins. Co., 762 F. Supp. at 595 (asserting that "[t] he purpose of having
an aggregate limit in addition to an occurrence limit is to cap the indemnity payments
made in a given policy period regardless of the number of occurrences").
69. Id.
70. For example, in Fibreboard Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., the policy-
holder contended that the $1 million aggregate limits contained in primary policies issued
by Hartford in 1978 and 1979 did not apply to asbestos-related claims against Fibreboard,
and that Fibreboard was therefore entitled to perpetual coverage subject only to the poli-
cies' per occurrence limits. 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 376, 380 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). By contrast,
Hartford contended that the aggregate limits of its policies applied to all asbestos-related
claims, thereby limiting Hartford's duty to indemnify Fibreboard to a total of $2 million for
asbestos-related bodily injury and property damage claims. Id. at 379. The California
Court of Appeals ultimately agreed with Hartford's interpretation, holding that the asbes-
tos-related claims against Fibreboard were "products hazard" claims and therefore subject
to the policies' aggregate limits for products hazard claims. Id. at 380.
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even covered under the insurer's policy.71 In such a case, policyhold-
ers and their insurers frequently settle for an amount somewhere be-
tween the possible litigated results. 72 For example, a policyholder
might seek coverage for a series of claims arising out of alleged bodily
injuries or property damage caused by the policyholder's use of lead
paint in its contracting work a half-century ago, with the policy-
holder's overall liabilities for these claims exceeding the $1 million
limits of the primary policy. The primary insurer, however, might ar-
gue that lead is a pollutant or irritant, and that the claims are there-
fore excluded from coverage by the policy's pollution exclusion. 73 In
such a case, the two possible litigated insurance coverage results are
that the insurer is liable for either zero or $1 million, but the parties
might assess their likelihood of prevailing at trial and settle for
$500,000. When such a settlement takes place, the settlement is neces-
sarily for more or less than the primary insurer's actual liability, creat-
ing an issue as to how the primary policy settlement should affect the
policy obligations of any excess insurers during that same policy
period.
2. Disputes Over the Application of Policy Limits.-A second reason
why a policyholder might end up settling its coverage claim for less
than the settling insurer's actual policy obligations arises out of the
interplay between the per occurrence limits and the aggregate limits
of the insurer's policy." While some policies are written such that the
policy's aggregate limit applies to all covered claims, many general
liability policies are written such that the aggregate limit applies only
71. See Seaman & Kittredge, supra note 5, at 708, 711-12 (examining different coverage
issues that may arise in insurance litigation).
72. Rob S. Register, Comment, Apportioning Coverage Responsibility of Consecutive Insurers
When the Actual Occurrence of Injury Cannot Be Ascertained: Who Has to Contribute in a Settle-
ment?, 49 MERCER L. REv. 1151, 1151-52 (1998) (noting that when questions arise regarding
liability coverage, the parties frequently enter into a settlement).
73. Courts have come to differing conclusions as to whether bodily injuries and prop-
erty damage occurring as a result of lead paint contamination fall within the terms of the
standard pollution exclusion. Compare Sullins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 667 A.2d 617, 624 (Md.
1995) (holding that the standard absolute pollution exclusion does not unambiguously
exclude coverage for lead paint-related bodily injury claims), with United States Liab. Ins.
Co. v. Bourbeau, 49 F.3d 786, 786-87 (lst Cir. 1995) (holding that the absolute pollution
exclusion unambiguously excludes coverage for lead paint-related property damage
claims).
74. See ABRAHAm, supra note 7, at 106 (explaining that CGL insurance "policies typically
provide coverage on a per occurrence basis, sometimes subject to an aggregate dollar limit
per policy. For example, a policy may provide limits of liability of $1 million per occur-




to certain enumerated types of claims.7" Indeed, for many years, an
aggregate limit clause used in many policies provided that the policy's
aggregate limit applied only to two types of claims: (1) products haz-
ard claims; and (2) completed operations hazard claims. 76 Under
such a clause, all other types of claims are not subject to an aggregate
limit, with the insurer's total exposure for these other types limited
only by the per occurrence limit of liability.7 7 Thus, for claims falling
outside of the aggregate limit, a determination of the number of oc-
currences involved is crucial in determining the insurer's ultimate
liability. 78
Assume that a policyholder has a primary general liability policy
with a $1 million per occurrence limit and a $1 million aggregate
limit, with the aggregate limit being applicable only to products haz-
ard and completed operations hazard claims. The policyholder is
sued by one thousand claimants who allege that they were injured by
the policyholder and those one thousand claims are settled for
$100,000 each, for a total liability of $100 million. Assume further
that there is no question that the policy covers the types of claims
asserted by the one thousand claimants against the policyholder and
that the claims do not involve bodily injury occurring in other policy
periods. The policyholder and its insurer might dispute whether all
one thousand claims arise out of a single occurrence, or whether the
claims arise out of one thousand separate occurrences. 79 Similarly,
the parties might dispute whether or not the claims arise out of one of
75. See id. at 292 (reproducing a commonly used 1973 policy form providing that ag-
gregate limits applied to products hazard claims and completed operations hazard claims);
id. at 308 (reproducing a commonly used 1966 policy form providing that aggregate limits
applied to products hazard claims and completed operations hazard claims). Some poli-
cies provide that their aggregate limits apply to other types of claims as well. For example,
one such policy stated that the aggregate limit applies to "all property damage arising out
of premises or operations rated on a remuneration basis." Allstate Ins. Co. v. Dana Corp.,
759 N.E.2d 1049, 1058 (Ind. 2001).
76. SeeABRAIJ, supra note 7, at 292, 308 (providing language used in some commer-
cial general liability policies from 1966 until 1986).
77. See OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 6, at 485 (stating that "[i]f all applicable policy
terms and conditions are satisfied, there is one set of per[-] occurrence policy limits availa-
ble for damages during a policy year arising out of each occurrence").
78. See id. (explaining that "[t]he determination of the number of occurrences giving
rise to the bodily injury or property damage for which the insured is liable can have a
significant impact on the amount of coverage available to respond to the claim or claims")
(internal quotation marks omitted).
79. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text (describing circumstances in which an




the hazards to which the policy's aggregate limit applies.8 0 The fol-
lowing grid demonstrates how a determination of the number of oc-
currences and the applicability of the policy's aggregate limit greatly
affect the amount that the primary insurer must pay in order to ex-
haust its policy obligations.
THE PRIMARY INSURER'S POLICY OBLIGATIONS UNDER DIFFERENT
NUMBER OF OCCURRENCES AND AGGREGATE LIMIT RULINGS
All 1000 Claims Arise The 1000 Claims Arise
Out of a Single Out of 1000 Separate
Occurrence Occurrences
The Policy's Aggregate $1 Million $1 Million
Limit Applies
The Policy's Aggregate $1 Million $100 Million
Limit Does Not Apply
Given that the primary insurer in the illustration above might
owe $1 million under the policy, or perhaps is liable for the entire
$100 million, it is easy to see that the policyholder and insurer might
settle this dispute for some amount between $1 million and $100 mil-
lion, a figure that will depend on each party's assessment of the likeli-
hood that the number of occurrences and aggregate limit issues
would be decided in its favor at trial. If the parties settle the dispute
for $10 million, the policyholder still has $90 million in uncompen-
sated losses. In such a case, the policyholder likely will turn to its ex-
cess insurer in that same policy period in an effort to obtain excess
coverage for the uncompensated losses.8"
In litigation between the policyholder and the excess insurer, the
excess insurer might argue that the aggregate limits of the primary
policy did not apply to the claim and that each claim arises out of a
separate occurrence.8 2 Under this view, the primary policy was liable
for the entire $100 million in claims against the policyholder, mean-
ing that the excess insurer would not have had any liability for the
80. See supra note 70 and accompanying text (noting an asbestos case in which the
policyholder asserted that the aggregate limit did not apply to the asbestos-related claim
while the insurer argued that the aggregate limit did apply to the claim).
81. Of course, if there is no excess insurance available for that policy period, the policy-
holder will have no remaining coverage available in that period for claims for which cover-
age under the primary policy is exhausted.
82. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 765 A.2d 891, 894 (Conn. 2001)
(presenting the excess insurer's argument that each underlying claim for which the plain-
tiff sought relief should be treated as a separate occurrence).
2003]
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claims had the policyholder's dispute with the primary insurer pro-
ceeded to a litigated resolution. 3 Ironically, the policyholder, which
argued to the primary insurer that the aggregate limit did not apply
and that each claim arose out of a separate occurrence, can obtain cover-
age from the excess insurer only by adopting the primary insurer's posi-
tion that the primary insurer's liability was capped at $1 million by
either the per occurrence limit or the aggregate limit of the primary
policy. An alternative argument frequently offered by policyholders is
that it need not prove that the primary insurer's obligations actually
were capped at $1 million, but only that the issues were sufficiently
unclear such that the $10 million settlement was fair and
reasonable.84
When the coverage dispute concerns the number of per occur-
rence limits of coverage available, the policyholder generally has an
incentive to argue that each claim arises out of a separate occurrence.
In some instances, however, a policyholder has a distinct incentive to
argue that all of the claims against it arise out of a single occurrence.
For example, many policies contain per occurrence deductibles or
self-insured retentions, which could limit or even eliminate, coverage
for a series of toxic tort claims if the claims generally are resolved for
amounts near or below the amount of the deductible or retention and
each claim arose out of its own occurrence.85 In addition to deduct-
ibles and self-insured retentions, policyholders employ a variety of
other devices that allow them to retain much or all of the risk associ-
ated with coverage under a primary policy, giving the policyholder a
litigation incentive to downplay the coverage provided by its primary
policies in order to access coverage under its excess policies. For ex-
ample, policyholders sometimes purchase "fronting policies," which
generally are policies that have a deductible equal to the coverage
83. See id. at 896 (holding that the excess insurer has no liability because the policy-
holder's liability did not exceed the per occurrence limits of the primary policy).
84. See Zeig v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 23 F.2d 665, 666 (2d Cir. 1928) (accepting the
argument that requiring a policyholder to completely exhaust its primary policy would do
more harm than good in terms of increasing delay, promoting litigation, and preventing
amenable settlement).
85. See Appalachian Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 676 F.2d 56, 60 (3d Cir. 1982)
(noting that a multiple occurrences ruling would leave the policyholder with no coverage
for a sex discrimination class action settlement because no member of the class received a
settlement payment in excess of the policyholder's $25,000 per occurrence retention);
Champion Int'l Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 546 F.2d 502, 505 (2d Cir. 1976) (observing that
finding multiple occurrences would leave the policyholder with no coverage for 1400 prop-
erty damage claims arising out of the policyholder's manufacture of defective paneling
because none of the individual claims would exceed the $5,000 per occurrence deductible
in the policyholder's primary policy).
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available under the policy or require the policyholder to reimburse
the insurer issuing the fronting policy for any amounts paid by the
insurer under the policy.86 Similarly, policyholders sometimes create
their own insurance company-called a captive insurer-to provide
lower-level coverage solely to the policyholder and affiliated compa-
nies, with excess policies issued by noncaptive insurers applying over
the limits of the captive insurer's coverage. 87 In any of these situa-
tions, the policyholder's incentive may be to characterize a series of
claims against it as arising out of a single occurrence in order to ex-
haust the "coverage" provided by the primary policy so the policy-
holder can access more favorable coverage available under its excess
policies.88 As a result, policyholders and their insurers often have dif-
fering views as to the number of occurrences involved in a series of
claims against the policyholder, which sometimes causes the parties to
compromise for an amount that ultimately is greater than or less than
the actual amount of coverage available under the policy.
86. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Pyramid Ins. Co. of Bermuda, Ltd., No. 92 Civ. 1816, 1994 WL
88701, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 1994). Fronting occurs when "an insurer, for a fee, issues a
policy with the intent of passing most or all of the risk back to the policyholder, or to an
unlicensed reinsurer or captive insurer." Id. (quoting INSURLAW Thesaurus, 1994 WIL
200 (IPI)). By entering into fronting arrangements, policyholders can retain the risk asso-
ciated with lower-level coverage while complying with financial responsibility laws and
transferring claims handling responsibility to the insurer issuing the fronting policy. Id.
For example, in Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Domino's Pizza Inc., Domino's Pizza's pri-
mary general liability and automobile liability policies were fronting policies which re-
quired the policyholder "to pay all indemnity and defense obligations for losses covered by
the policy." 144 F.3d 1270, 1272 (9th Cir. 1998). The policyholder also had excess poli-
cies, which were not fronting policies, applying excess of the primary fronting policies. Id.
at 1272-73.
87. One court defined a captive insurer as "a corporation organized for the purpose of
insuring the liability of its owner. Although there may be other permutations, generally
the insured is both the sole shareholder and the only customer of the captive insurer."
Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 625 A.2d 1, 5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993) (cita-
tions omitted), revd in part on other grounds, 650 A.2d 974 (N.J. 1994).
88. See Appalachian Ins. Co., 676 F.2d at 60 (noting a policyholder's assertions that inju-
ries suffered by sex discrimination class action plaintiffs all arose out of a single occur-
rence, a result which would require the policyholder to pay just one $25,000 per
occurrence retention to settle the class action); Champion Int'l Corp., 546 F.2d at 505 (not-
ing a policyholder that asserted 1400 product liability claims arose out of a single occur-
rence where the policyholder had a $5000 per occurrence deductible); Colonial Gas Co. v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 823 F. Supp. 975, 984 (D. Mass. 1993) (holding that a policyholder's
installation of hazardous insulation in 400 homes arose out of a single occurrence, where
the policyholder's policy required it to pay $100,000 in deductibles and retrospective pre-
miums for each claimed occurrence); Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 597 F.
Supp. 1515, 1528 (D.D.C. 1984) (holding that all of the asbestos-related claims against a
policyholder arose out of a single occurrence, where the policyholder had per occurrence
retentions in several of its policies).
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3. Policy Releases in Settlement of Prior Claims.-One other way that
a policyholder often settles a policy for an amount less than the actual
policy obligations is uniquely a function of occurrence-based liability
insurance. As discussed above, the standard occurrence-based general
liability policy covers losses arising from bodily injury or property dam-
age occurring during the policy period, no matter when the injury is
discovered or suit is filed against the policyholder.81 Often, a policy-
holder in settling a series of claims will accept a payment from the
insurer in return for a release of the entire policy." ° Thus, an insurer
with significant lead paint liabilities very well might have entered into
a settlement with its primary insurer in the early 1980s in which the
insurer released all claims to coverage under the primary policy. In-
deed, sometimes policyholders and insurers settle discrete coverage
claims by way of a policy buy-back, whereby the insurer pays the policy-
holder an agreed-upon sum in return for the policyholder's complete
release of all claims, known or unknown, for coverage under the
policy. 1
But what happens when the same policyholder receives a spate of
claims in the late 1990s in which claimants allege to have been injured
during the time the released policy was in effect by exposure to asbes-
tos on the policyholder's premises? Assume further that the asbestos
claims would not have been subject to any exclusions under the re-
leased primary policy. Because such claims allege injury occurring on
the policyholder's premises, the policyholder likely will argue that the
claims are not subject to the aggregate limit for products hazard or
completed operations hazard coverage. 2 As a result, in the absence
of the policy release from the lead paint claims, the primary insurer
normally would be required to provide coverage for the asbestos
claims, but is relieved of that obligation by virtue of its prior settle-
ment and policy release. In such a case, the policyholder's excess in-
surers will likely argue that the policyholder cannot transfer liability
89. See Abraham, supra note 6, at 2103 (stating that "[t]he trigger of coverage under a
CGL policy has always been and continues to be the occurrence of bodily injury or prop-
erty damage 'during the policy period"').
90. See, e.g., Aerojet Gen. Corp. v. Transcon. Ins. Co., No. C036514, 2002 WL 1265692,
at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. June 7, 2002) (describing a settlement between Aerojet and one of its
insurers in which the insurer agreed to pay $62.3 million to Aerojet in return for a release
of all claims under the insurer's policies).
91. See id. (noting that a policyholder's final settlement with their primary insurer was a
"Policy Buy-Back").
92. ABRAHAMi, supra note 7, at 287-88 (reprinting a common 1973 policy form defining
the products hazard and completed operations hazard as applying only to bodily injury or
property damage occurring "away from premises owned by or rented to the named
insured").
[VOL. 62:30
2003] INSURANCE COVERAGE SETTLEMENTS
for the asbestos claims from the primary insurer to the excess insurers
through its prior release of the primary insurer for less than its total
policy obligations." Instead, the excess insurers will argue that the
policyholder, by virtue of its release of the primary insurer, must stand
in the primary insurer's shoes and fund itself any claims that ordina-
rily would have been recoverable under the released primary policy.9 4
II. THE EFFECT OF AN UNDERLYING SETTLEMENT ON AN
EXCESS INSURER'S OBLIGATIONS
When a policyholder seeks coverage from an excess insurer, but
has settled with and released an underlying insurer, there are three
possible results: (1) the policyholder settled with the underlying in-
surer for exactly the amount that the underlying insurer owed under
its policy; (2) the policyholder settled with the underlying insurer for
less than the underlying insurer would have owed had its coverage obli-
gations been fully litigated;9 5 or (3) the policyholder settled with the
underlying insurer for more than the insurer would have owed had its
coverage obligations been fully litigated. The focus of this Article is
upon the common situation where a policyholder has settled with and
released an insurer in return for a payment that arguably is less than
the settled insurer's policy obligations.
A. The Development of a General Rule for Below-Limits Settlements
Many of the early cases dealing with below-limits settlements by
underlying insurers involved instances where the settling insurer's ap-
plicable policy limits were not in dispute, nor was there a dispute that
the settling insurer paid less than those policy limits in return for its
93. See Aerojet Gen. Corp., 2002 WL 1265692, at *14 (explaining that a policy buy-back
settlement did not constitute "admission of liability" in the primary policy and, therefore,
the policy had not been exhausted). Actually, more than one of these situations can occur
in the same case. A policyholder and its insurer might, for example, dispute whether the
aggregate limit of a policy applies to a particular set of claims and also dispute whether a
policy exclusion precludes any coverage at all for the claim. In such a case, the policy-
holder and insurer might settle their differences by taking each of these disputes into
account in deciding on a settlement amount.
94. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Dana Corp., 759 N.E.2d 1049, 1063 (Ind. 2001) (noting
that the excess insurer had no obligation to indemnify the policyholder for environmental
liabilities that would have been covered by the primary insurer in the absence of the policy-
holder's release of the primary insurer).
95. See Zeig v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 23 F.2d 665, 665-66 (2d Cir. 1928) (describing
a case where a policyholder settled for $6000 when its combined policy limits were
$15,000); Stargatt v. Fid. & Cas. Co., 67 F.R.D. 689, 690 (D. Del. 1975) (noting that the
policyholder settled for $135,000 when its primary policy was for $250,000), affd mem., 578
F.2d 1375 (3d Cir. 1978).
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release. From the standpoint of the policyholder and the settling in-
surer, such a below-limits settlement often makes sense in that the
settling insurer receives a discount on its maximum possible liability in
return for compromising its potential coverage defenses. However,
excess insurers in these cases often argued that they had no duty to
respond unless the policyholder actually collected the full policy limits
from the underlying settled insurer.96
Indeed, the case establishing what has become the predominant
rule for treatment of below-limits settlements is Zeig v. Massachusetts
Bonding & Insurance Co.97 In Zeig, the policyholder sought coverage
for a burglary loss from an insurer whose policy was in excess of three
underlying policies.98 While the three underlying policies had com-
bined policy limits of $15,000, the policyholder settled its claims
under the three underlying policies for a total payment of $6000."9
The excess insurer declined coverage, arguing that its liability began
only after the underlying insurers had paid a total of $15,000 on the
loss. 00
The Second Circuit rejected the excess insurer's argument, hold-
ing instead that the excess insurer was liable for that portion of the
loss exceeding the actual limits of the underlying policies, even if the
underlying insurers paid less than those limits in settlement. The Sec-
ond Circuit arrived at this result for three reasons. First, the excess
insurer's policy, while providing that it applied excess of the underly-
ing coverage, did not explicitly state that the policyholder's actual col-
lection of the underlying limits was a precondition to coverage under
the excess policy.' 0 1 In the absence of explicit language in the policy,
the court then had to consider what result was the most consistent
with the purposes of excess insurance. In that regard, the court noted
that the excess insurer "had no rational interest in whether the in-
sured collected the full amount of the primary policies, so long as it
was only called upon to pay such portion of the loss as was in excess of
96. As one commentator notes:
The traditional view of the duties of an excess insurer is that it owes no obligation
to defend or indemnify its insured unless and until any retained limit and the
limits of any primary or other underlying insurance have been "exhausted" . ..
[and] drafters of excess policies almost certainly intended exhaustion to mean the
actual payment of losses.
Bower, supra note 12, at 536.
97. 23 F.2d 665 (2d Cir. 1928).






the limits of those policies."' 2 Finally, the court explained that re-
quiring actual collection of the limits of underlying policies would "in-
volve delay, promote litigation, and prevent an adjustment of disputes
which is both convenient and commendable."' 03
Thus, the Zeig court adopted the rule that an insurer whose policy
applies excess of underlying policies is not necessarily freed from lia-
bility where the policyholder has settled with the underlying carriers
for less than their policy limits.10 4 Instead, the excess insurer's policy
is triggered, but only to the extent that the policyholder's loss exceeds
the actual policy limits of the underlying policies, with the policy-
holder being liable for any gap in coverage caused by its below-limits
settlement(s). 105 As a result, the excess insurer in Zeig was liable for
that portion of the policyholder's loss in excess of $15,000, subject to
the insurer's own policy limits, with the policyholder remaining re-
sponsible for the $9000 gap in coverage caused by its settlement of
$15,000 in underlying coverage for a total payment of $6000.106
The vast majority of courts considering below-limits settlements
have adopted the Second Circuit's analysis in Zeig. For example, in
Stargatt v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York,"°7 the policyholder's pri-
mary policy had a $50,000 deductible with applicable limits of
$250,000, and the policyholder also had a $750,000 excess policy is-
sued through Lloyd's of London. 108 Although the policyholder's lia-
bilities exceeded its $50,000 deductible and the $250,000 limits of the
primary policy, Lloyd's sought summary judgment, arguing that the
primary coverage was not exhausted because the policyholder settled
with its primary carrier for $135,000.19 The court, relying on Zeig,
rejected the Lloyd's argument that a below-limits settlement of under-




105. Id. (noting that "[o]nly such portion of the loss as exceeded ... the limits of these
policies, is covered by the excess policy").
106. Id.
107. 67 F.R.D. 689 (D. Del. 1975), affd mem., 578 F.2d 1375 (3d Cir. 1978).
108. Id. at 690.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 691. The court explained:
If summaryjudgment is denied here, it will still be plaintiff's burden to prove the
amounts of McDonnell's losses and their covered nature. The excess insurers will
be liable only for covered losses in excess of $300,000. I believe the reasoning of
the Zeig case is correct, and I am confident that the Delaware courts would reach
the same result in this case. Accordingly, summary judgment will be denied.
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Several other courts have come to the same conclusion."' These
courts have held that, so long as the policyholder's actual covered lia-
bilities exceed its underlying policy limits, the policyholder can obtain
coverage for the excess amount from its excess insurer, subject of
course to the terms, conditions, and limits of the excess policy. For
example, the New Mexico Supreme Court held in Rummel v. Lexington
Insurance Co. that the policyholder could collect from Lexington once
its covered liabilities exceeded the $6 million attachment point of the
Lexington policy. 1 2 The court so concluded, even though insurers
111. See E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Lloyd's & Cos., 241 F.3d 154, 172-73 (2d Cir. 2001)
(per curiam) (affirming trial judge's ruling that excess insurers were liable once the policy-
holder's liability exceeded the limits of underlying coverage in a given policy period);
Chem. Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 177 F.3d 210, 228-29 (3d Cir.
1999) (holding that nonsettling excess insurers were entitled to a set-off for the actual
policy limits of settling underlying insurers even though such a set-off left the policyholder
liable for a gap in coverage greater than $11 million); UNR Indus., Inc. v. Cont'l Cas. Co.,
942 F.2d 1101, 1108 (7th Cir. 1991) (providing that "[w]hether or not the underlying
insurer performed the obligations within its coverage, [the excess insurer] remains liable
for claims beyond that underlying coverage"); Kelley Co. v. Cent. Nat'l Ins. Co., 662 F. Supp.
1284, 1289 (E.D. Wis. 1987) (holding that an excess insurer was liable only for liability
exceeding the settling primary insurer's applicable policy limits plus the policyholder's
deductible); Union Indem. Ins. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, 614 F. Supp. 1015,
1017 (S.D. Tex. 1985) (explaining that excess insurers' obligations do not begin until poli-
cyholder's loss exceeds applicable limits of primary policy); Siligato v. Welch, 607 F. Supp.
743, 747 (D. Conn. 1985) (stating that "Allstate's liability cannot be increased by the fact, if
true, that the present value of [the primary insurer's] settlement agreement did not equal
its $300,000 coverage"); Benroth v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 132 F. Supp. 270, 276 (W.D. La. 1955);
Gould, Inc. v. Arkwright Mut. Ins. Co., No. 3 CV-92-403, 1995 WL 807071, at *3 (M.D. Pa.
Nov. 8, 1995) (observing that "an excess insurer has no rational interest in whether the
insured collected the full amount of the primary policies, so long as it was only called upon
to pay such portion of the loss.., in excess of the limits of those policies"); Drake v. Ryan,
514 N.W.2d 785, 789 (Minn. 1994) (holding that insurer excess of a $30,000 primary policy
was liable for judgment in excess of $30,000, even though primary insurer paid only
$20,000 in settlement); Gould, Inc. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 585 A.2d 16, 19 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991)
(holding that the policyholder's below-limits settlement with underlying insurers would
not affect the attachment point of a nonsettled excess insurer); Teigen v. Jelco of Wis.,
Inc., 367 N.W.2d 806, 810 (Wis. 1985) (holding that below-limits settlement of primary
policyholder triggered excess insurer's policy, but only to the extent the policyholder's
liability exceeded the $500,000 policy limits of the settling insurer). Other courts, while
not directly considering the effect of underlying settlements on an excess insurer's obliga-
tions, have recognized that an excess insurer's obligations only begin above the applicable
limits of underlying insurance. See Valentine v. Aetna Ins. Co., 564 F.2d 292, 298 (9th Cir.
1977) (stating that "if during settlement negotiations the primary insurer is allowed to
force the excess insurer to cover part of the primary's insurance exposure, the coverages
and rate structures of the two different types of insurance-primary and excess-would be
distorted, and excess insurance premiums would have to be adjusted"); Cont'l Cas. Co. v.
United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 516 F. Supp. 384, 393 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (observing that an
excess insurer cannot be required to contribute to a settlement within the limits of under-
lying coverage).
112. 945 P.2d 970, 979 (N.M. 1997).
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whose policies were underlying the Lexington policy had settled for
less than their policy limits or were in the process of litigating cover-
age with the policyholder."' Indeed, a New Jersey state court has
held that an excess carrier had no need for discovery of the policy-
holder's settlement agreements with underlying carriers because the
attachment point of the excess carrier is based on the limits of the
underlying policies, as opposed to the amount paid by the underlying
carriers in settlement:
Thus, an excess carrier is entitled to a credit, not from the
primary carrier's settlement, but from the amount allocable
to the primary under its policies. In other words, the excess
carrier is entitled to a credit for the full amount of the pri-
mary carrier's coverage before it is required to pay any
cleanup expense. This credit has nothing to do with the de-
tails of the settlements between UMC and the other
insurers.at 4
Accordingly, courts confronted with a policyholder that has en-
tered into a below-limits settlement with its lower-level insurers typi-
cally have held that an excess insurer is liable only for those amounts
exceeding the actual limits of the underlying, settled policies, with the
policyholder being responsible for any gap in coverage caused by its
release of the underlying insurers. This factual scenario, however,
must be distinguished from that of the "partial settlement," where ju-
dicial treatment is far less uniform.115
In a "partial settlement," the policyholder and its primary insurer
(or several of its lower-level insurers), settle with a tort claimant in
such a way that eliminates their liability but leaves the nonsettling ex-
cess insurers exposed to an adverse tort judgment." 6 In essence, the
policyholder makes a payment to the tort claimant (funded in whole
or in part by the lower-level insurers), in return for the tort claimant's
113. Id. (stating "Lexington is still liable for those damages that exceed $6,000,000, even
if the underlying $6,000,000 is not fully paid").
114. UMC/Stamford, Inc. v. Allianz Underwriters Ins. Co., 647 A.2d 182, 190-91 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1994).
115. See generally Bower, supra note 12; David Greenwald, Partial Settlements By Primary
Insurers: A Critique, 29 TORT & INS. L.J. 555 (1994) (discussing judicial treatment of partial
settlements).
116. See Greenwald, supra note 115, at 556. The author explains:
The partial release form of settlement is a three-way agreement among a plaintiff,
a defendant, and the defendant's primary insurer. The plaintiff reserves its right
to sue on its claims, but agrees to seek satisfaction of any resulting judgment
solely from the excess insurer and only to the extent that the judgment exceeds




agreement not to execute on the portion of any tort judgment that
ordinarily would be covered by the settling insurers."'i For example,
if a policyholder had a $100,000 primary policy and a $5 million ex-
cess policy, the policyholder and primary insurer might settle with the
tort plaintiff for $50,000. In return, the tort plaintiff agrees not to
execute on the first $100,000 of any judgment she might receive at
trial. Such agreements also frequently include an agreement by the
tort plaintiff not to execute any judgment against the policyholder's
personal assets." 8 Partial settlements are used most often where the
excess insurer refuses to contribute to a settlement or disputes its cov-
erage obligations."'
Some courts, particularly those in Minnesota and Wisconsin, have
found partial settlements to be virtually indistinguishable from below-
limits settlements, and have applied the Second Circuit's reasoning in
Zeig to hold excess insurers liable for judgment amounts exceeding
their respective attachment points.12 The rationale of these decisions
is that the nonsettling excess insurers are not prejudiced in any mean-
ingful way because they are not required to pay that portion of a tort
judgment that is below their attachment points. 12'
On the other hand, other courts have found the Zeig rule to be
inapplicable to partial releases because the essence of the partial re-
lease is that the settlement agreement does not represent the policy-
holder's true liability. For example in Federal Insurance Co. v.
Srivastava, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
held that the policyholder's "liability" was not the amount of a $31.6
million tort judgment where the tort plaintiff agreed to release the
first $22 million of the judgment in return for a payment by the poli-
117. Id.
118. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Riverside Ins. Co., 509 F. Supp. 43, 49-50 (E.D. Mich. 1981)
(reproducing the text of a partial release).
119. See Bower, supra note 12, at 548-49 (discussing partial settlements in light of an
excess insurers good-faith non-participation in an unsatisfactory settlement).
120. Kelley Co. v. Cent. Nat'l Ins. Co., 662 F. Supp. 1284, 1289 (E.D. Wis. 1987); Drake v.
Ryan, 514 N.W.2d 785, 788-89 (Minn. 1994); Teigen v.Jelco of Wis., Inc., 367 N.W.2d 806,
810 (Wis. 1985); Loy v. Bunderson, 320 N.W.2d 175, 185 (Wis. 1982).
121. In Drake v. Ryan, the court wrote:
Furthermore, State Farm should not be concerned with the amount the plaintiffs
received from Dairyland [the primary insurer]. The agreement provides that "in
the event of any judgment which may be obtained by plaintiffs against defend-
ants, $30,000 [the policy limits] shall be credited against any such judgment * * *
" Thus, State Farm is not prejudiced because it is only being asked to fulfill its
contractual obligations to its insured-to provide coverage in excess of that pro-
vided by the primary Dairyland policy.
514 N.W.2d at 789 (second alteration in original).
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cyholder and its lower-level insurers of $8.5 million.'22 Under the
terms of the partial settlement, the most that the tort plaintiff actually
could collect was $18.1 million of the $31.6 million tort judgment, 123
an amount less than the attachment point of the nonsettling excess
insurer's policy. Because the policyholder's actual loss did not exceed
the excess insurer's attachment point, the court held that the Zeig rule
did not render the excess insurer liable for any portion of the tort
judgment. 12 4
None of the cases involving partial releases, however, is inconsis-
tent with the Second Circuit's decision in Zeig.t25 The cases finding
Zeig inapplicable to partial settlements do not quarrel with the Zeig
court's analysis; instead, they find Zeig inapplicable only because the
policyholder's true liability is not reflected in the tort judgment en-
tered against the policyholder. 126 Thus, both lines of cases consider-
ing the effectiveness of partial releases begin with the concept that
Zeig is the law of the land, but differ only as to whether a tort judg-
ment subject to a partial settlement reflects the policyholder's actual
liability for insurance coverage purposes.127
122. 2 F.3d 98, 99-101 (5th Cir. 1993).
123. The $18.1 million figure is composed of the $8.5 million the tort plaintiff received
in the partial settlement plus the portion of the tort judgment in excess of $22 million. Id.
124. Id. at 103 (citing the court's expression in Zeig, the court stated, 'Judge Hand as-
sumed that the insured's loss was fixed before any settlement with the primary insurers.
With the loss set, there was little danger that primary insurers could, contrary to the con-
tracted-for risk, shift any part of their burden to excess carriers."). Applying Indiana law,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit came to the same conclusion in
a case involving similar facts. See United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Lay, 577 F.2d 421, 423 (7th
Cir. 1978) (holding that an excess insurer is not liable where the policyholder, through
settlement, has been fully released from any personal liability for the tort plaintiff s loss).
125. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 120 and infra note 126 (illustrating that while
Minnesota and Wisconsin courts differ from Srivastava and Lay in defining the applicability
of Zeig to partial settlements, both lines of cases begin with the premise that Zeig provides
the appropriate analytical framework).
126. Srivastava, 2 F.3d at 103; Lay, 577 F.2d at 423.
127. See Srivastava, 2 F.3d. at 103 (acknowledging Zeig's analysis, but finding that "since
the insured's loss does not reach the layer of [the excess insurer's] coverage, [the excess
insurer] has no liability"); Lay, 577 F.2d at 423 (acknowledging the viability of Zeig but
distinguishing it on the grounds that the insured never became liable for an amount ex-
ceeding the excess insurer's attachment point); Kelley Co. v. Cent. Nat'l Ins. Co., 662 F.
Supp. 1284, 1288 (E.D. Wis. 1987) (beginning with a reference to Zeig in its analysis of
whether policyholder's deductible must actually be paid or whether a credit was sufficient);
Drake v. Ryan, 514 N.W.2d 785, 786-87 (Minn. 1994) (referring to policy language by
which the parties agreed to be bound by the "principles and rules established in the case of
[Teigen] and [Lay]" both of which apply Zeig's fundamental analysis); Teigen v. Jelco of
Wis., Inc., 367 N.W.2d 806, 812 (Wis. 1985) (declaring that, even in light of partial settle-
ment, it was not "unreasonable in this case for [the excess insurer] to defend against the
claims falling within the parameters of its coverage"); Loy v. Bunderson, 320 N.W.2d 175,
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B. Treatment of Below-Limits Settlements in "Modern" Coverage Litigation
1. The Uncertainties Inherent in "Modern" Coverage Litigation.-One
of the chief virtues of the Zeig rule is the ease by which it can be ap-
plied. Where the policyholder appears to have settled with underlying
insurers for less than their policy obligations, the court simply reviews
the underlying policies and holds the nonsettled excess carriers liable,
subject to the terms of their own policies and any applicable coverage
defenses, for the portion of the liability that exceeds the actual policy
obligations of the settled insurers.'28 As a result, the policyholder is
free to eliminate a portion of its downside risk by settling with one or
more of its insurers, while nonsettling excess insurers remain free to
litigate their coverage defenses, including exhaustion defenses,129
without having underlying settlements to which they were not parties
somehow affect the application of their policies.13 ° In a sense, this
rule makes the fact of underlying, below-limits settlements irrelevant
to the rights and obligations of policyholders and their nonsettling
excess insurers, and the litigation proceeds as if there had been no
underlying settlements."'
One feature present in Zeig, and many of the early cases adopting
the Zeig court's reasoning, was certainty as to the settled insurer's ap-
plicable policy limits. For example, in Zeig, there was no question but
that the settling insurers had issued $15,000 in coverage and that they
had paid only $6000 in settlement of the policyholder's coverage
claim.'1 2 Because the policyholder's loss happened on a single, easily
identifiable day, there was also no dispute as to which policy period
would be triggered by the claim if it were covered. 3 3 Thus, if a policy-
holder settled with some of its insurers for less than their actual policy
limits, the reason for such a below-limits settlement almost always was
in the form of a coverage discount to account for the possibility that
185 (Wis. 1982) (finding "no fundamental unfairness" in holding excess insurer liable for
judgment amount exceeding its attachment point).
128. See supra notes 107-110 and accompanying text.
129. See, e.g., Stargatt v. Fid. & Cas. Co., 67 F.R.D. 689, 690 (D. Del. 1975) (setting forth a
typical exhaustion defense in which the excess insurer argues that "since the limits of the
primary policy were not exhausted by the settlement, no liability could arise under the
excess policy"), aff'd mem., 578 F.2d 1375 (3d Cir. 1978).
130. See id. at 691 (explaining that "the [excess insurer] had no rational interest in
whether the insured collected the full amount of the primary policies, so long as it was only
called upon to pay such portion of the loss as was in excess of the limits of those policies").
131. See id. (reasoning that "[iuf summary judgment is denied here, it will still be [the]
plaintiff's burden to prove the amounts of [the policyholder's] losses and their covered
nature").




the claim might fall outside of the coverage of the settling insurer's
policy. 134
In the past two decades, however, several developments in insur-
ance coverage law have made it less obvious at the settlement stage as
to which policy periods provide coverage for a claim or claims against
the policyholder, and the limits available under each policy in the
event that coverage exists.135 These developments have had at least
two effects as it relates to below-limits settlements. First, the likeli-
hood of below-limits settlements has increased because of the addition
of a second uncertainty in a policyholder's dispute with its insurers.
Where cases such as Zeig involved only one level of uncertainty-
whether the claim fell within the terms of coverage set forth in the
policy-cases today often involve that threshold coverage dispute and
a dispute as to which policy periods must respond to the claim.' 36 Sec-
ond, disputes as to whether aggregate limits apply to a claim or series
of claims, and as to how many per occurrence limits of liability should
apply in the event the claims are outside the aggregate limit, greatly
affect the obligations of each insurer even in cases where there is no
dispute that the claims against the policyholder are covered by the
various insurers' policies.
137
In several cases decided in the early 1980s, typically with respect
to insurance disputes over asbestos-related bodily injury claims, courts
held that a single asbestos claim could trigger coverage under policies
issued in more than one policy period-a multi-year trigger of cover-
age. 138 For example, in Insurance Co. of North America v. Forty-Eight
134. See Stargatt, 67 F.R.D. at 690 (noting that the policyholder settled his claim against
his primary insurer for "a cash payment of not more than $135,000 and a release of [the
excess insurer's] counterclaim"). But see Bower, supra note 12, at 539 (discussing Zeig and
stating that the reasons for the partial settlement are not provided in the opinion).
135. See infra notes 138-163 (discussing impact on insurance coverage of the multi-year
trigger of coverage and aggregate limits disputes).
136. See Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1218-19 (6th
Cir. 1980) (resolving the uncertainty involved in applying a multi-year trigger of coverage
policy to an asbestos-related bodily injury claim by articulating that the plaintiff had a claim
in every policy period in which he suffered injurious exposure to the policyholder's asbes-
tos products), claified and affJd on reh'g, 657 F.2d 814 (6th Cir. 1981).
137. See supra notes 76-88 and accompanying text (discussing the significance of the
interplay between per occurrence limits and aggregate limits in determining an insurer's
coverage obligations).
138. See Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (finding
multi-year policy triggered in every policy period from the date of first exposure through
manifestation of asbestos-related disease); Porter v. Am. Optical Corp., 641 F.2d 1128, 1145
(5th Cir. 1981) (adopting Forty-Eight Insulations's "injurious exposure" theory and "logically
consequent rule of proration of liability for insurance carriers who were on the coverage
while the injured party was exposed to the asbestos hazards which resulted in illness and
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Insulations, Inc.,'3 9 the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit held that a claim against a policyholder for asbestos-related
bodily injury triggered coverage in every policy period during which
the policyholder suffered injurious exposure to the policyholder's as-
bestos products.14° In allocating the loss among each of the triggered
policy periods, the court held that liability should be prorated among
all of the triggered policies by time on the risk during the claimant's
period of exposure. 4 ' Thus, if a claimant were exposed to the policy-
holder's asbestos products for ten years, an insurer issuing a one-year
primary policy during that time would be liable for one-tenth of the
policyholder's liability for that claim, subject to the insurer's other
coverage defenses and limits of liability.142 In addition, under the
Forty-Eight Insulations regime, the policyholder is liable for any portion
of the liability allocated to periods for which it lacked responsive
insurance. 143
One year later, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
went one step further and held in Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North
America'44 that an asbestos-related bodily injury claim against a policy-
holder triggered coverage in every policy period from the date of first
exposure through the manifestation of asbestos-related disease. 145
Thus, the Keene court expanded on the Sixth Circuit's Forty-Eight Insu-
lations "exposure trigger" by holding that asbestos-related bodily injury
claims triggered policy periods during which injurious exposure oc-
curred as well as policy periods between the time the claimant's active
exposure ceased and the date that his or her asbestos-related disease
manifested itself.'4 6 The Keene court, however, rejected the Sixth Cir-
cuit's proration rule, holding instead that the policyholder could se-
lect any triggered policy to pay the entire claim, subject to its limits of
liability.' 47 Once the policyholder selected a triggered insurer to pay
the entire claim, that insurer could recoup a portion of the liability by
seeking contribution from other triggered insurers, but the Keene
death"); Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d at 1218-19 (holding that several years of multi-year
policy were triggered by asbestos exposure).
139. 633 F.2d 1212.
140. Id. at 1218-19, 1226.
141. Id. at 1225.
142. See id.
143. Id.
144. 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981).





court prohibited contribution from the policyholder for any unin-
sured periods.148
Since the Forty-Eight Insulations and Keene decisions, many courts
have adopted multi-year triggers of coverage for bodily injury claims,
both asbestos claims and nonasbestos claims, as well as for various
types of progressive property damage claims, including claims based
on the policyholder's liability for long-term environmental contamina-
tion.149 The advent of the multi-year trigger has changed insurance
coverage litigation in that it has injected an additional litigable issue
in determining each insurer's policy obligations. When a policy-
holder seeks coverage from insurers on the risk in many different
years for environmental contamination, the parties legitimately might
dispute when the covered property damage first took place and when
it ended. Thus, even if a court has held that every policy period from
first contamination through manifestation is triggered for the policy-
holder's claim, such a ruling does not resolve the factual question of
when the covered contamination began and when it became manifest.
Indeed, given that general liability policies typically exclude coverage
for property damage to the policyholder's own property, the factual
dispute often turns not on when contamination began, but when the
contamination first migrated off the policyholder's property and onto
the property of another.150
Given these developments in insurance coverage law, a policy-
holder might very well contend that covered property damage took
place over a ten-year period, and thereby settle with one of its primary
148. Id. at 1050.
149. See Spartan Petroleum Co. v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 162 F.3d 805, 810-11 (4th Cir.
1998) (finding that multiple policy periods may be triggered by progressive, indivisible
property damage taking place over several years); Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims
Mgmt. Corp., 73 F.3d 1178, 1198-99 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding multi-year trigger of coverage
for asbestos-related bodily injury claims), modified, 85 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 1996); Commercial
Union Ins. Co. v. Sepco Corp., 765 F.2d 1543, 1546 (11th Cir. 1985) (finding multi-year
exposure trigger for asbestos-related bodily injury claims). For scholarly discussions on the
advent of the multi-year trigger of coverage for progressive, indivisible bodily injury or
property damage claims, see Abraham, supra note 6, at 2105-07; Bratspies, supra note 64, at
1229-31; Lee H. Ogburn, The Progression of Trigger Litigation in Maryland-Determining the
Appropriate Trigger of Coverage, Its Limitations, and Ramifications, 53 MD. L. REv. 220, 221-24
(1994); Tung Yin, NailingJello to a Wall: A Unformn Approach for Adjudicating Insurance Cover-
age Disputes in Products Liability Cases with Delayed Manifestation Injuries and Damages, 83 CAL.
L. REv. 1243, 1261-74 (1995); Chandra Lantz, Note, Triggering Coverage of Progressive Property
Loss: Preserving the Distinctions Between First- and Third-Party Insurance Policies, 35 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 1801, 1804-08 (1994); Register, supra note 72, at 1153-57.
150. Spartan Petroleum Co., 162 F.3d at 808 (concluding "that the injury-in-fact must be to
the third-party's property and thus that the gasoline contamination of the [third-party's]




insurers for ten percent of its overall liability. For example, a policy-
holder with $1 million in liability might settle with a primary insurer
on the risk for one of the ten years for a payment of $100,000. If,
however, the nonsettling carriers prove at trial that the covered prop-
erty damage began later than the date asserted by the policyholder,
such that the covered property damage took place in only five years, a
flat pro rata allocation would allocate $200,000 to each of the five pol-
icy periods. 151 In such a case, the policyholder's settlement with its
one primary insurer for $100,000 was too low (assuming that the pri-
mary insurer's policy limits were at least $200,000), leaving a question
as to who should be liable for the $100,000 gap caused by the policy-
holder's below-limits settlement. If there is an excess insurer on the
risk in the settled primary carrier's year, the policyholder likely will
contend that the excess insurer should be liable for the $100,000 gap,
with the policyholder's argument being that its reasonable settlement
with the primary insurer exhausts the primary policy and triggers the
excess insurer's obligations. On the other hand, the excess insurer
likely will argue that it is irrelevant whether the policyholder's settle-
ment with its primary insurer was a reasonable, good-faith settlement;
the primary insurer's actual obligation was for the full $200,000 alloca-
ble to the policy period, and the excess insurer's obligations do not
begin until the policyholder's liabilities exceed the actual policy limits
of the primary policy.
There is no question that the fact-dependent nature of modern
trigger of coverage analysis can create uncertainty as to the applicable
trigger of coverage period, which in turn can result in a policyholder
entering into a settlement that is less than the settled insurer's actual
policy obligations.' 52 While that scenario is common, and can create
significant gaps in coverage, a more intriguing and potentially higher
stakes scenario arises when the policyholder and its insurers dispute
whether the aggregate limits in the insurers' policies apply to the poli-
cyholder's claims.
151. This example assumes that the jurisdiction at issue requires proration of the policy-
holder's liability to each triggered policy period by time on the risk. However, even if a
jurisdiction allows the policyholder to select one policy period to pay the entire claim the
analysis is the same, assuming that there are no periods where the policyholder lacks re-
sponsive insurance, because subsequent contribution actions among the insurers would
leave $200,000 of the liability in each of the five triggered policy periods. See Koppers Co.
v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 98 F.3d 1440, 1449-50 n.9 (3d Cir. 1996) (noting that the ultimate
results of a pro rata and a joint and several allocation are similar except where the policy-
holder has an uninsured period or where one or more triggered insurers is insolvent).
152. See, e.g., Spartan Petroleum Co., 162 F.3d at 810 (demonstrating in the context of
asbestos-related bodily injury claims and environmental pollution the difficulty in ascer-
taining the applicable trigger of coverage period).
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When a policyholder faces an avalanche of toxic tort claims, it is
not uncommon for the policyholder and its insurers to dispute
whether the aggregate limits of the policyholder's policies apply to the
losses at issue. The most prominent current example of this phenom-
enon is the trend by which companies facing asbestos-related bodily
injury suits contend that the products hazard and completed opera-
tions hazard aggregate limits of their policies do not apply to asbestos
claims arising out of the policyholder's installation (as opposed to
mere manufacture or sale) of asbestos-containing products.1 5 An-
other argument offered by policyholders, to only limited success, is
that products hazard aggregate limits do not apply to underlying
products liability suits that include allegations of a failure to warn of
the dangerous nature of the policyholder's product. This argument
holds that the liability for a failure to warn claim arises out of the
policyholder's conduct and not out of the defective nature of its prod-
uct.15 4 Policyholders and insurers also sometimes dispute whether the
153. See Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Porter Hayden Co., 698 A.2d 1167, 1209 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1997) (holding that coverage potentially existed for claims alleging exposure to
asbestos during the policyholder's installation of asbestos even though the policy did not
provide coverage for products hazard or completed operations hazard claims); Frontier
Insulation Contractors, Inc. v. Merchs. Mut. Ins. Co., 690 N.E.2d 866, 870 (N.Y. 1997)
(holding that insurers on the risk had a duty to defend, but not necessarily to indemnify,
the policyholder for claims alleging exposure to asbestos, while installing asbestor-contain-
ing products, even where no products hazard coverage was available). But see Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co. v. Wallace & Gale Co. (In reWallace & Gale Co.), 275 B.R. 223, 241 (D. Md. 2002)
(explaining that a claim stemming from alleged installation-related asbestos exposure
would be subject to a products hazard or completed operations hazard aggregate limit for
insurers issuing policies after the policyholder had completed the installation process),
vacated in part on other grounds, 284 B.R. 557 (D. Md. 2002)); Johnson v. Studyvin, 828 F.
Supp. 877, 884 (D. Kan. 1993) (holding that the allegation of asbestos-related property
damage was a products hazard claim for insurers issuing policies after the policyholder had
completed the installation process).
154. Scarborough v. N. Assur. Co., 718 F.2d 130, 136 (5th Cir. 1983); Farm Bureau Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Lyon, 528 S.W.2d 932, 934 (Ark. 1975); Colony Ins. Co. v. H.R.K., Inc., 728
S.W.2d 848, 851 (Tex. App. 1987). Nevertheless, most courts have correctly rejected this
argument, holding that claims involving injuries arising out of the policyholder's product
are products hazard claims even if the policyholder is alleged to have failed to warn of the
hazards associated with the product. These courts reason that the underlying claimant's
injury arises out of the defective or unreasonably dangerous nature of the product, render-
ing the claim a products hazard claim, even if the claimant also alleges negligence, failure
to warn, or some other conduct-based cause of action. Brazas Sporting Arms, Inc. v. Am.
Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 220 F.3d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir. 2000); Northland Ins. Co. v. Guards-
man Prods., Inc., 141 F.3d 612, 618-19 (6th Cir. 1998); Ottv. Crews, 830 F.2d 773, 776-77
(7th Cir. 1987); Beretta, U.S.A., Corp. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 117 F. Supp. 2d 489, 495 (D. Md.
2000); Brewer v. Home Ins. Co., 710 P.2d 1082, 1084 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985); K-C Mfg. Co. v.
Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 434 So. 2d 1004, 1007 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Cobbins v. Gen.
Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 290 N.E.2d 873, 877 (Ill. 1972); Tiano v. Aetna Cas.
& Sur. Co., 301 N.W.2d 476, 480 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980); Pa. Gen. Ins. Co. v. Kielon, 492
N.Y.S.2d 502, 503-04 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985); Lindley Chem. v. Hartford Accident & Indem.
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policies' aggregate limits apply to environmental property damage
claims. 
155
In cases where a court accepts a policyholder's argument that the
policies' aggregate limits do not apply to a particular class of claims,
the policies' per occurrence limits become the only limitation on the
insurer's duty to provide coverage to the policyholder.' 5 6 As a result,
if each claim were held to arise out of a separate occurrence, a pri-
mary insurer theoretically could face perpetual, first-dollar liability for
mass tort claims implicating its policy period,157 with liability shifting
to the excess layer of coverage (or to the policyholder if there is no
excess layer of coverage) only to the extent that the amount of a par-
ticular claim exceeds the primary policy's per occurrence limits.' 5
8
Disputes over the applicability of policy aggregate limits can lead
to high stakes coverage litigation between a policyholder and its pri-
mary-level insurers. Some policyholders, such as companies that pre-
viously manufactured or sold asbestos-containing products, can face
hundreds of thousands of tort suits,' 5 9 which in turn can create overall
liability in the hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars. 60 Yet,
if each claim arises out of a separate occurrence, these hundreds of
Co., 322 S.E.2d 185, 188 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984); LaBatt Co. v. Hartford Lloyd's Ins. Co., 776
S.W.2d 795, 799 (Tex. App. 1989).
155. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Dana Corp., 759 N.E.2d 1049, 1063 (Ind. 2001) (involv-
ing a dispute over whether primary policies had aggregate limits applicable to the policy-
holder's environmental claims). See generally Jeannine W. Chanes, Endless Liability:
Determining Aggregate Limits for Environmental Pr oerty Damage in Pre-1986 Liability Policies, 13
ENVrL. CLAIMs J. 3 (2000) (discussing disputes over the applicability of liability policies'
aggregate limits to environmental claims).
156. See infra note 163 and accompanying text (asserting that Porter Hayden represents a
primary insurer's worst-case scenario by exposing it to the possibility that its policy might
never exhaust with respect to certain claims).
157. Of course, if the policies are subject to a deductible or self-insured retention, the
insurer's liability is not actually first-dollar liability because first-dollar liability remains with
the policyholder. For ease of discussion, this Article assumes that there are no applicable
deductibles or self-insured retentions for the policyholder's policies. In cases where a poli-
cyholder's coverage is subject to a deductible or self-insured retention, the analysis
throughout this Article remains the same, with an insurer having first-dollar liability only
after the policyholder has satisfied all applicable deductibles and retentions.
158. See Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Porter Hayden Co., 698 A.2d 1167, 1209-11 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1997) (finding asbestos-related claims at least arguably outside the products
hazard, with a concomitant finding that each claim arises out of a separate occurrence).
159. See In reJohns-Manville Corp., 52 B.R. 940, 941 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (explaining that at
the time Johns-Manville had filed for bankruptcy, approximately 17,000 claims had been
filed against the company for asbestos related health problems).
160. For example, by the time Owens Coming filed for bankruptcy protection in Octo-
ber 2000, it had paid $1.1 billion in judgments and settlements for asbestos-related bodily
injury claims. DEBORAH HENSLER ET AL., ASBESTOS LITIGATION IN THE U.S.: A NEW LOOK AT
AN OLD ISSUE 25 (RAND Institute for CivilJustice Aug. 2001) (copy on file with author); see
also Tarica v. McDermott Int'l, Inc., No. Civ. 99-3831, 2000 WfL 1346895, at *1 (E.D. La.
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thousands of claims can be settled or reduced to judgment without
ever exhausting the per occurrence limits of the primary policies. 61
On the other hand, a primary insurer with, for example, a $1 million
per occurrence and $1 million aggregate limit will have its total liabil-
ity for the asbestos claims against its policyholder capped at $1 million
if either the claims fall within the products hazard aggregate limit or
all of the claims arise out of a single occurrence. 162 Thus, in this ex-
ample, the determination of the number of occurrences and the ap-
plicability of the policy's aggregate limits can mean the difference
between $1 million in total liability and endless, first-dollar liability on
the part of the primary insurer.1 61
Given the enormity of the stakes involved, it is hardly surprising
that these disputes often settle. It is here that the policyholders' typi-
cal argument often becomes a game of high-stakes poker. Policyhold-
ers frequently argue that a reasonable settlement with underlying
insurers exhausts those underlying policies and triggers the indemnity
obligations of the lowest-level nonsettled carrier to pay amounts over
and above the amount actually received from the settling underlying
insurer.' 64 If the policyholder's claims are not subject to the policies'
aggregate limits, but all of the claims against the policyholder arise
out of the single occurrence, the policyholder's argument is that the
nonsettled excess insurers must immediately begin indemnifying the
policyholder until they have exhausted the per occurrence limits of
Sept. 19, 2000) (explaining that in 1999 McDermott International estimated its asbestos
liability to be $1.562 billion).
161. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 765 A.2d 891, 896 (Conn.
2001) (holding that more than 100,000 asbestos claims settled by the policyholder for
about $250 million would not exhaust the $25 million per occurrence limits of the underly-
ing primary policies because the claims arose out of multiple occurrences).
162. Cf ABRAHAm, supra note 7, at 109-10 (explaining the dynamics of aggregate limits
with different dollar amounts).
163. See Porter Hayden Co., 698 A.2d at 1209-11 (holding that injuries incurred during the
policyholder's installation of asbestos within the policy period potentially fall outside the
products hazard and that each claim constitutes a separate occurrence). Porter Hayden po-
tentially represents the primary insurer's worst-case scenario, where the primary insurer's
policy might never exhaust with respect to claims involving the policyholder's installation
of asbestos-containing products during the insurer's policy period. If the holding of Porter
Hayden were applied beyond the duty to defend, and held to include the duty to indem-
nify, claims involving injuries arising out of the policyholder's installation of asbestos prod-
ucts during the policy period would implicate excess coverage only to the extent that a
particular claim exceeds the per occurrence limit of the primary policy.
164. See Koppers Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 98 F.3d 1440, 1454 (3d Cir. 1996) (consid-
ering, and ultimately rejecting, the policyholder's argument that an excess insurer must




their excess policies. 165 Thus, in the nonproducts, single occurrence
scenario, the debate is over whether nonsettled excess insurers must
fill the gap in coverage between the actual policy limits of the underly-
ing settled insurers and the settlement amounts paid by those insur-
ers, or whether that gap in coverage must be funded by the
policyholder. 66
More pernicious is the argument involved where the policyholder
contends that each mass tort claim is not subject to policy aggregates
and arises out of a separate occurrence. Here, the excess insurer cor-
rectly argues that, in the absence of a settlement, the limits of the
primary policy would never exhaust, and would be liable in perpetuity
for each claim up to the primary policy's per occurrence limit.
167
From that fact, the excess insurers typically argue that they are liable
only to the extent that an individual claim exceeds the released pri-
mary policy's per occurrence limit.1 68
The policyholder, however, responds to this argument by con-
tending that its reasonable settlement with the primary insurer ex-
hausts that policy and triggers the next-lowest-level insurer's
obligations.169 The policyholder's argument, then, is that once it has
released the primary insurer in a reasonable settlement, the lowest-
level nonsettled excess insurer becomes liable for all succeeding
claims, subject only to its own per occurrence limit.171 If this argu-
ment were to succeed, it would mean that the lowest-level nonsettled
insurer's policy never exhausts, 17 1 and that the nonsettled excess in-
surer becomes primarily liable for all of the policyholder's future
claims. This argument essentially is a game of "hot potato," with the
policyholder claiming an ability to transfer perpetual, first-dollar lia-
165. See Marick, supra note 4, at 731-32, 735 (discussing the excess insurer's duty to
indemnify generally, and identifying the point at which an excess insurer's obligation at-
.taches as one of controversy, especially in a situation where the insured and primary policy-
holder have settled for an amount below the primary policy's limit).
166. Id. at 735 (citing U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Lay, 477 N.E.2d 1322 (7th Cir. 1978) as the
"principal decision supporting the position of excess insurers that such [below-limits] set-
dements are improper").
167. In this situation, however, the primary insurer normally would be liable only for
covered claims, or the portion of covered claims, allocable to the primary insurer's policy
period. See id. at 716 (presenting an overview of a primary insurance carrier's obligations).
168. Seaman & Kittredge, supra note 5, at 676.
169. See id. at 685 (discussing a policyholder's argument that a below-limits settlement
with a primary insurer functionally exhausted that policy).
170. See id. at 656 (describing excess insurance as "the next 'layer(s)' or 'level(s)' of
coverage above the primary [insurance policy] contract").
171. Of course, even under this scenario, the excess insurer's policy would exhaust for a
particular claim if the policyholder's liability for that claim exceeded the per occurrence
limit of the excess insurer's policy.
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bility to any excess insurer by settling with and releasing all of the
underlying insurers. Of course, in the absence of a settlement be-
tween the policyholder and its primary insurer, the excess insurers
could never face perpetual, first-dollar liability.
Fortunately, courts have rejected the argument that the uncer-
tainties of "modern" coverage litigation, and the public policy in favor
of settlement of disputes, should require nonsettled excess insurers to
pay amounts that would have been the responsibility of an underlying
insurer in the absence of that insurer's settlement with the policy-
holder.'72 Instead, courts have held that an excess insurer remains
free to litigate the extent of coverage that would have been available
to the policyholder under the underlying settled policies, with the ex-
cess insurers responsible only for amounts exceeding the amount that
would have been allocated to the underlying settled carriers in the
absence of a settlement.173 In effect, then, these courts have reaf-
firmed the rule that the policyholder must fill any gap in coverage,
including a perpetual, first-dollar obligation, caused by the policy-
holder's settlement with one or more of its insurers.' 74
2. Treatment of Underlying Settlements in "Modern" Coverage
Litigation.-Perhaps the leading "modern" insurance coverage deci-
sion concerning the effect of underlying settlements on the obliga-
tions of excess insurers is the Third Circuit's decision in Koppers Co. v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.'75 In Koppers, the policyholder sought cov-
erage from its general liability insurers for environmental liabilities
that the policyholder faced with respect to 150 different sites.176 Al-
though all of the insurers initially denied coverage, by the time of
trial, all of Koppers's insurers other than its London market insurers
had settled.' 77 Because the London market insurers had subscribed
to excess policies only, the court was confronted with determining the
effect of underlying insurers' settlements on an excess insurer's
obligations.' 78
172. Stargatt v. Fid. & Cas. Co., 67 F.R.D. 689, 690 (D. Del. 1975), affd mein., 578 F.2d
1375 (3d Cir. 1978); Gasquet v. Comm. Union Ins. Co., 391 So. 2d 466 (La. Ct. App. 1980).
173. See Bower, supra note 12, at 53843 (examining the court's holding in Zeigas well as
those that followed or reached similar results regarding nonsettling insurers).
174. Id.
175. 98 F.3d 1440 (3d Cir. 1996).
176. Id. at 1444.
177. Id. Koppers had initially brought suit against two of its primary insurers, then
amended its complaint to include its excess insurers and additional primary insurers. Id.
178. Id. (noting that "[t]he district court limited the scope of trial to twelve specific




Relying in part on the Pennsylvania Superior Court's decision in
Gould, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co.,179 the Third Circuit recognized
that the appropriate way to deal with underlying below-limit settle-
ments was to hold the excess insurer liable only for the portion of the
policyholder's liability that exceeds the applicable policy limits of the
underlying settled policies."' 0 Indeed, the Koppers decision provides
perhaps the best statement of the appropriate treatment of settled un-
derlying insurance and the rationale supporting such a treatment:
[S]ettlement with the primary insurer functionally "ex-
hausts" primary coverage and therefore triggers the excess
policy-though by settling the policyholder loses any right to cover-
age of the difference between the settlement amount and the primary
policy's limits. The excess insurer cannot be made liable for any part
of this difference because the excess insurer never agreed to pay for
losses below a specified floor (i.e., below the limits of the underlying
primary policies). Courts have adopted this rule because it en-
courages settlement and allows the insured to obtain the
benefit of its bargain with the excess insurer, while at the
same time preventing the insured from obtaining a double
recovery. 181
The Third Circuit's decision in Koppers is no anomaly when it
comes to treatment of below-limits settlements in "modern" insurance
coverage litigation, where uncertainty may exist as to the policy peri-
ods triggered by a loss as well as the application of policy limits to the
policyholder's claims. In Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. v. Aetna Cas-
ualty & Surety Co.,182 the Third Circuit was once again confronted with
determining the appropriate treatment of underlying below-limits set-
tlements, this time under New Jersey law."83 In Chemical Leaman, the
policyholder sought coverage from its insurers for environmental lia-
bilities at the policyholder's Bridgeport, Connecticut site.'14 Chemi-
cal Leaman eventually settled with its primary insurer, Aetna, and
then sought coverage from its excess insurers for amounts in excess of
Aetna's settlement payment.1 8 5 The parties, however, disputed the ap-
propriate attachment point of the excess policies. 186 Chemical
Leaman argued that the excess insurers' obligations should begin
179. 585 A.2d 16 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
180. Koppers, 98 F.3d at 1454.
181. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
182. 177 F.3d 210 (3d Cir. 1999).
183. Id. at 214-15.
184. Id. at 214.
185. Id. at 217-19.
186. Id. at 226-27.
[VOL. 62:30
INSURANCE COVERAGE SET-LEMENTS
once Chemical Leaman's liability at the Bridgeport site exceeded
$5,226,750, which was the portion of the Aetna settlement allocated
by the settling parties to that site. 187 The excess insurers argued that
their policies could not be required to respond until Chemical
Leaman's liabilities exceeded the actual limits of coverage available
under the underlying Aetna policies, even if Aetna had in fact paid a
lesser amount in settlement.188 Relying in part on a prior decision by
New Jersey's intermediate appellate court, the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit held that a policyholder must fill any gap in cover-
age caused by its settlement with an underlying insurer for less than
the settled insurer's actual policy limits.
189
Similarly, in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co.,' 9 ° the policyholder (Met Life) had faced, and likely would
continue to face, hundreds of thousands of asbestos lawsuits alleging
that Met Life for many years had concealed the hazards of asbestos
from the general public. 9' By 1999, the policyholder had faced about
200,000 claims, with half of them settled at a nuisance value of about
$2500 per claim, for total payments of about $250 million. 9 2 From
1976 to 1986, Met Life had primary and lower-level excess insurance
from Travelers with annual per occurrence limits of $25 million." 3 In
1993, after litigating with Travelers over coverage for asbestos claims,
Met Life settled with Travelers in return for a lump sum payment of
$300 million, at which point Met Life sought coverage from its excess
insurers.194
The trial court granted summary judgment to all of the nonset-
tled excess insurers, reasoning that the asbestos claims against Met
Life arose out of a sufficiently large number of occurrences that Met
Life would never exhaust the actual policy obligations of the settled
Travelers policies.195 On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court
agreed. 9 6 First, the court adopted the rule that Met Life could not
187. Id. at 226.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 227 (quoting Chem. Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 978 F.
Supp. 589, 602 (D.N.J. 1997), rev'd, 177 F.2d 210 (3d Cir. 1999)). For a discussion of the
UMC/Stamford decision, see supra note 114 and accompanying text.
190. 765 A.2d 891 (Conn. 2001).
191. Id. at 893.
192. See id.
193. Id. at 893-94.
194. Id. at 893-94 n.2.
195. Id. at 895 (citing Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., No. X04CV
950115305S, 1999 WL 244642, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 16, 1999), affd, 765 A.2d 891
(Conn. 2001)).
196. Id. at 893.
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obtain coverage from its excess insurers in a particular year until its
liabilities exceeded the actual policy obligations of the underlying, but
released, Travelers policies."O7
Having adopted this principle, the court affirmed the trial court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of the nonsettled excess insurers.
Accordingly, the court held that the number of occurrences involved
in the claims against Met Life ensured that no single occurrence
would exceed the $25 million per occurrence limits of the settled
Travelers policies.' Thus, the Metropolitan Life court expressly fol-
lowed the widely-accepted rule that a policyholder is liable for any gap
caused by its below-limits settlement with an underlying insurer, and
that such obligations could not be foisted upon the nonsettled excess
insurers.' 99
In an even more recent decision, the Indiana Supreme Court re-
jected a policyholder's attempt to impose the terms of its primary set-
tlement on its excess insurers.2z° In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Dana Corp.,
the policyholder sought coverage from its liability insurers for envi-
ronmental contamination liabilities incurred at sixty-three different
sites. 20 ' These environmental liabilities were of the "modern" variety
in that they implicated multiple policy periods and involved disputes
over whether the aggregate limits of the primary policies applied to
the policyholder's liabilities.20 2 By the time the case reached the Indi-
ana Supreme Court, the policyholder had settled with all of its insur-
ers except Allstate, which had issued first-layer excess policies that
applied excess of primary policies issued by The Hartford Insurance
Group.20 Allstate defended on the grounds that the aggregate limits
in the underlying Hartford policies did not apply to the environmen-
197. The court stated: "The defendants' insurance policies all provide a stated dollar
amount of insurance on a per occurrence basis, and are in excess of [the] Travelers cover-
age of $25 million per occurrence. Thus, the defendants'policies are not implicated until Metro-
politan exhausts the underlying coverage of $25 million per occurrence." Id. at 894 (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
198. Id. at 893, 896 n.12. The court held that the "occurrence" for each claimant was
the claimant's initial exposure to asbestos, but held that a "continuous exposure" clause in
the Travelers policies had the effect of combining "claims arising from exposure to asbes-
tos at the same place at roughly the same time into one occurrence." Id. at 896. Because
Metropolitan did not present evidence to suggest that its liability to any set of claimants
exposed at the same place and at roughly the same time exceeded $25 million, the court
granted summary judgment in the excess insurers' favor. Id. at 896 n.12.
199. See supra notes 183-189 (discussing those court rulings which are consistent with
Koppers).
200. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Dana Corp., 759 N.E.2d 1049, 1063 (Ind. 2001).
201. Id. at 1052.
202. Id. at 1057-60.
203. See id. at 1052.
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tal claims at issue, meaning that an Allstate excess policy was not impli-
cated unless the policyholder's liability for a particular site exceeded
the per occurrence limit of the underlying settled Hartford primary
policy.204
Dana Corporation, joined by Hartford as an intervenor, argued
that the aggregate limit in the Hartford primary policies applied to
Dana's environmental liabilities.2"5 Under the policyholder's argu-
ment, each of the Hartford primary policies would exhaust when
Dana's total property damage liability allocated to the policy period
exceeded the Hartford policy's aggregate limit, and Allstate would
then provide first-dollar coverage on all subsequent claims until the
Allstate policies exhausted.20 6 Hartford further argued that because
the parties to the Hartford policies-Dana and Hartford-were in
agreement regarding the proper construction of the policy, Allstate
had no right to urge a policy construction other than that to which
the contracting parties agreed.2 7
The Indiana Supreme Court rejected Hartford's argument, hold-
ing that "Allstate, as an excess carrier, is entitled to rely on the under-
lying policies in evaluating its risks." 20 ' Having recognized an excess
insurer's right to challenge the policyholder's (and primary insurer's)
construction of the primary policy, the court then explicitly observed
that a first-layer excess policy becomes implicated only when the poli-
cyholder's liability exceeds the applicable limits of the underlying pri-
mary policy.209 To the Dana court, it was irrelevant whether the
underlying primary insurer settled for less than its policy limits be-
cause Dana-and not the excess insurer-would be liable for any
amounts that would have been allocated to the released Hartford poli-
cies in the absence of a settlement. "Allstate's coverage attaches as
soon as liabilities are incurred in the amount of the underlying Hart-
ford limits for the applicable coverages. Whether Dana's settlement with
Hartford actually exhausted the underlying limits is also irrelevant; if it did
not, then Dana is self-insured up to the applicable limits. '2 10
Thus, the Dana court adopted the rule-first announced in Zeig
and widely-followed since-that an excess insurer is liable only when
the policyholder's liabilities exceed the actual limits of the underlying
204. Id. at 1063.
205. See id.
206. Id. at 1058-59.
207. Id. at 1060.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 1063 n.10 (emphasis added).
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policies, even if the policyholder received less than such limits in un-
derlying settlements. 21' To the extent that the policyholder's settle-
ments cause a gap in coverage, the policyholder must pay that amount
before seeking coverage from its excess insurers. 2  Indeed, the Dana
court explicitly held that if the primary policies were found on re-
mand not to have applicable aggregate limits, Dana's release of Hart-
ford would require Dana to step in Hartford's shoes and pay first-
dollar amounts on all future environmental liabilities, with Allstate be-
ing liable only to the extent that Dana's liability at a particular site
exceeded the per occurrence limits of the released Hartford
policies.213
3. Policyholders' Faulty Reliance on the Supposed "Squibb Doc-
trine. "--As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, there is a consider-
able body of case law, including so-called "modern" coverage
decisions, holding that a policyholder and its lower-level insurers may
not through settlement unilaterally reduce the attachment point of
nonsettling excess insurers. Nevertheless, policyholders continue to
threaten excess insurers with the specter of gap-filling obligations, in-
cluding the supposed threat of perpetual first-dollar coverage obliga-
tions. In making this argument, policyholders generally invoke as
their main authority a series of trial court decisions from the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York in coverage
litigation between E.R. Squibb & Sons and its insurers over coverage
for Squibb's liabilities as makers of the drug diethylstilbestrol
(DES).214
However, such reliance on the trial court's rulings in Squibb is
misplaced for two reasons. First, policyholders read too much into
the Squibb decisions; by the time the trial court had finished with the
issue, it had explicitly recognized that a policyholder, and not a non-
settling excess insurer, bears the risk of a below-limits settlement with
underlying insurers.2 5 Second, even if policyholders' reading of the
Squibb trial court rulings were correct, the Second Circuit on appeal
explicitly rejected the notion that a policyholder and its lower-level
211. Id. at 1063.
212. See id. at 1063 n.10.
213. Id. at 1063 (explaining that "[i]f there is a per occurrence limit [and no aggregate
limit] on Hartford's property damage coverage, then Dana must have incurred $1 million
in liability at the Old Forge site alone . . . before Allstate's coverage attaches").
214. See E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Accident & Cas. Ins. Co., 853 F. Supp. 98 (S.D.N.Y.),
clarified and affd, 860 F. Supp. 124 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
215. See E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Lloyd's & Cos., 241 F.3d 154, 173 (2d Cir. 2001) (per
curiam) (describing the trial court's reasoning).
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insurers could increase an excess insurer's coverage obligations
through settlement.2
16
In the first pertinent Squibb trial court decision, United States Dis-
trictJudge Vincent L. Broderick considered a variety of issues ranging
from trigger of coverage for DES claims to the policy obligations of
Squibb's excess insurers.217 In an opinion that confusingly treats set-
tlement of underlying tort suits and settlement of insurance coverage
disputes interchangeably, the court arguably endorsed requiring ex-
cess insurers to respond to DES claims once Squibb's liability ex-
ceeded the amounts actually received from underlying settled
insurers: "Absent collusive arrangements to defraud an excess carrier,
not present here, [an excess] carrier ... must pay amounts due the
insured which are unpaid for any reason, including a compromise
reached by a first-tier carrier through an arm's length settlement. "218
Shortly thereafter, Judge Broderick issued a "clarifying" opinion
that cast doubt on this conclusion. 219 In this clarification, Judge Brod-
erick reaffirmed his view that an excess insurer's obligation com-
menced upon exhaustion of the underlying coverage, and that "such
exhaustion may occur by payment or settlement, provided the settle-
ment is noncollusive and at arm's length."220 Tellingly, however,
Judge Broderick further noted that where an excess policy applies in
excess of a given amount, an excess insurer cannot be required to pay
amounts below that stated attachment point, commenting:
A question has been raised concerning the effect of a provi-
sion in an excess carrier's policy that a given amount must be
satisfied by underlying insurers or Squibb before the excess
carrier is liable. Such provisions create the equivalent of a
deductible, which may be satisfied by payment or settlement
by other carriers. Until such a deductible is satisfied by ei-
ther or a combination of these methods or by unreimbursed
payments by Squibb if the policy so provides the excess car-
rier is not liable to Squibb.22
If anything, Judge Broderick's "clarification" only muddied the
waters, as his second opinion suggests that amounts below an excess
insurer's attachment point are properly viewed as akin to a deductible
216. Id. at 172-73.
217. ER. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 853 F. Supp. at 99.
218. Id. at 101.
219. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Accident & Cas. Ins. Co., 860 F. Supp. 124 (S.D.N.Y.
1994).
220. Id. at 126.
221. Id. at 127.
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that must be satisfied-either by the policyholder or the underlying
insurers-before the excess insurer's obligation begins. 22 Such a de-
termination is fully consistent with the many cases holding that a poli-
cyholder must fill any gap caused by its below-limits settlement with an
underlying insurer.22
3
Indeed, the third trial court decision in Squibb on this issue clari-
fied that any gaps in coverage caused by a below-limits settlement
would be the responsibility of the policyholder.224 In this third itera-
tion, certain excess insurers argued that their attachment points
should increase because some of the underlying insurers paid settle-
ment amounts that ended up exceeding their actual policy obliga-
tions.225 The excess insurers' basic argument was that if their
attachment points were not increased to account for the alleged
above-limits settlements, Squibb would reap a windfall by collecting
from its insurers more than it would owe to the DES claimants. 226
Judge John S. Martin, who had replaced judge Broderick on the
Squibb case, rejected this argument, holding instead that the excess
insurers' obligations began once Squibb's liability exceeded the actual
policy limits of the underlying settled policies, regardless of the
amount received by Squibb in settlement.227 Central to Judge Mar-
tin's ruling was his recognition that Squibb, by settling with the under-
lying carriers, accepted the risk that it might have to fill gaps in
coverage caused by settlements later determined to be less than the
settling insurers' policy obligations, meaning that any windfall caused
by an above-limits settlement should belong to Squibb as well.228
Thus, the Squibb trial court ultimately came to the same conclu-
sion as practically every court considering the effect of underlying be-
222. Id.
223. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Dana Corp., 759 N.E.2d 1049, 1063 (Ind. 2001).
224. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Accident & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 82 CIV. 7327(JSM), 1997
AIL 251548, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 1997).
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at *2-3.
228. Id. at *2 (noting that Squibb "ran the risk that the amount it received in those
settlements would be less than it was ultimately obligated to pay"). It should be noted that,
even though courts have more or less uniformly required the policyholder to fill coverage
gaps caused by below-limits settlements, there is far less consensus that a policyholder
should reap any benefit caused by an above-limits settlement. These courts have recog-
nized a public policy prohibiting a policyholder to reap a profit from its commission of
tortious conduct through advantageous settlements with its liability insurers. See supra note
25 (noting that Chemical Leaman Tank Lines v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., recognized the
public policy against permitting a policyholder to reap a double recovery whereby it recov-
ers more from its insurers than the amount of the loss it has suffered). 177 F.3d 210, 228-
29 (3d Cir. 1999).
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low-limits settlements: that an excess insurer cannot be required to
pay amounts that would have been chargeable to an underlying in-
surer in the absence of a settlement of the underlying coverage.229
Even so, policyholders continued to invoke Squibb as support for the
possibility of a "nightmare scenario" where an excess insurer is re-
quired to fill a significant gap in coverage, even with the possibility of
perpetual, first-dollar coverage obligations for claims not subject to
the policies' aggregate limits.
2 0
Efforts by policyholders to rely on the Squibb trial court decisions,
however, were once and for all dashed by the Second Circuit's opin-
ion on appeal.231 In E.R Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Lloyd's & Companies,
the Second Circuit considered an appeal from Judge Martin's ruling
concerning the appropriate attachment point of nonsettled excess in-
surers. First, the Second Circuit characterized the trial court's ulti-
mate ruling as holding the nonsettling excess insurers liable for
precisely the amounts that they would have been liable for in the ab-
sence of settlements by underlying insurers. 232
Having so characterized the district court's treatment of underly-
ing settlements, the Second Circuit then approved of Judge Martin's
approach, explicitly recognizing that the policyholder bears the risk of
a below-limits settlement with its insurers. The court characterized
the excess insurers' argument regarding a double recovery by Squibb
as "ultimately unpersuasive" because:
[Squibb] undoubtedly took the risk that the size of the settle-
ments would be inadequate to cover the settling insurers'
pro rata share. In such a case, Squibb would have been left
holding the bag. ... Under the court's approach, the settling par-
ties are the ones who took the risk of settlement, and the nonsettling
parties are left precisely as they would have been had no settlement
occurred. That hardly seems unfair.233
If that were not enough, the Second Circuit cited as legal support for
its ruling the Third Circuit's decision in Koppers Co. v. Aetna Casualty
& Surety Co.,2 34 perhaps the leading modern case concerning the ap-
propriate treatment of below-limits settlements. The Squibb court ap-
229. EA Squibb & Sons, Inc., 1997 WL 251548, at *2.
230. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Lloyd's & Cos., 241 F.3d 154, 173 (2d Cir. 2001) (per
curiam) (explaining that "the settling parties are the ones who took the risk of settlement,
and the nonsettling parties are left precisely as they would have been had no settlement
occurred").
231. Id.
232. Id. at 172.
233. Id. at 173 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
234. 98 F.3d 1440 (3d Cir. 1996).
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provingly characterized Koppers as requiring courts to "reduc[e] the
excess insurers' liability by the settling primary insurers' pro rata shares
by relying on the policy limits of the primary policies, not the actual
settlement amounts. 235
Thus, even if the trial court rulings in Squibb supported the no-
tion that an excess insurer must provide coverage for amounts in ex-
cess of any reasonable underlying settlement (a proposition that is far
from clear from the trial court decisions themselves), the Second Cir-
cuit's decision on appeal drives a stake through the heart of such a
reading. Not only does the Second Circuit characterize the trial
court's ruling as treating the excess insurers' obligations as being un-
affected by the existence of underlying settlements, but the Second
Circuit expressly noted that the settling parties (and the policyholder
in particular) bear the risk that a primary insurer's settlement pay-
ment turns out to be less than the settling insurer's actual policy
obligations.236
III. THE RATIONALE UNDERLYING THE TREATMENT OF A
NONSETTLING EXCESS INSURER'S OBLIGATIONS IN LIGHT OF
SETTLEMENTS BY UNDERLYING INSURERS
As the foregoing analysis has demonstrated, courts overwhelm-
ingly have held that a nonsettling excess insurer's obligations begin
only when the policyholder has exhausted the policy limits of the un-
derlying insurers, even if one or more of those insurers settled for
some lesser amount. Courts have not made a nonsettling excess in-
surer drop down to provide coverage that would have been available
under a settling insurer's policy, even if the underlying insurer's settle-
ment was objectively reasonable.237 This treatment makes sense be-
cause it is consistent with the risks assumed by an excess insurer and
prevents a policyholder and its lower-level insurers from transferring
obligations (collusively or innocently) from themselves to a nonset-
tling excess insurer.23 8
235. E.A Squibb & Son,, Inc., 241 F.3d at 173.
236. Indeed, a more recent decision from the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of New York held that the Squibb trial court decisions did not require an excess
insurer to provide coverage for any gap between the underlying settled insurer's actual
policy obligations and the amount paid by that underlying insurer in settlement. United
States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Treadwell Corp., 58 F. Supp. 2d 77, 110-11 n.28 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
Moreover, the Treadwell court expressly held that a nonsettled excess insurer's obligations
would not begin until either the policyholder or the settled carrier had paid amounts ex-
ceeding the actual limits of the settled policy. Id. at 112-13.
237. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Dana. Corp., 759 N.E.2d 1049, 1063 (Ind. 2001).
238. ER. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 241 F.3d at 173.
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Most fundamentally, when an excess policy is written to apply ex-
cess to the coverage provided by an underlying policy, the only rea-
sonable way in which that obligation can be measured is in relation to
the coverage obligations of the underlying policy. 239 Requiring an ex-
cess insurer to provide coverage immediately excess of any reasonable
underlying settlement, even if the underlying insurer's actual obliga-
tions were greater, would distort the excess insurer's policy to apply
excess to underlying payments or underlying settlements where the ex-
cess policy is written to apply excess to the underlying coverage.2 4 °
If policyholders were permitted to have their way, thereby requir-
ing excess policies to attach immediately excess of a reasonable under-
lying settlement, it would break down the very principles upon which
insurance policy premiums are based. 241 As discussed previously, pri-
mary insurance is more expensive than excess insurance, per dollar of
coverage provided, in part because of the increased likelihood that
the policyholder will incur liability that will implicate the primary in-
surer's policy. 24 2 In the absence of a deductible or self-insured reten-
tion, every covered claim involving bodily injury or property damage
during the policy period will implicate the primary insurer's policy.243
By contrast, an excess insurer issuing coverage in the same year will
have to pay a covered claim only if the policyholder's liability is suffi-
ciendy high that it exceeds the limits of underlying coverage. 24 4
Therefore, if an excess insurer were required to attach at a lower
point based on the policyholder's below-limits settlement with an un-
derlying insurer, it would pervert the premium structure of the excess
policy. Consequently, the excess insurer would be required in effect
to provide coverage at a lower attachment point (which is more ex-
pensive per dollar of coverage) than the attachment point upon
which the excess insurer's premium was calculated. 245
239. See Chem. Leaman Tank Lines v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 177 F.3d 210, 227 (3d Cir.
1999). The Third Circuit wrote: "The excess insurer cannot be made liable for any part of
this difference [between the underlying policy's actual limits and the amount recovered
from the underlying insurer in settlement] because the excess insurer never agreed to pay
for losses below a specified floor (i.e., below the limits of the underlying policy)." Id. (quot-
ing Chem. Leaman Tank Lines v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 978 F. Supp. 589, 602 (D.NJ.
1997), rev'd, 177 F.3d 210 (3d Cir. 1999)).
240. Koppers Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Ins. Co., 98 F.3d 1440, 1454 (3d Cir. 1996).
241. Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Heddington Ins. Ltd., 883 F. Supp. 158, 163-64 n.11
(S.D. Tex. 1995), affd mem., 84 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 1996). Excess insurance can be charac-
terized by lower policy premiums and reduced risk of payout. Id.
242. Bower, supra note 56, at 21.
243. Marick, supra note 4, at 716.
244. Seaman & Kittredge, supra note 5, at 672.
245. The same principle applies to differing levels of excess insurance. The higher the
attachment point, the cheaper the insurance per dollar of coverage, the rationale being
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Moreover, where an excess policy is written to apply excess of one
or more underlying policies, the attachment point of the excess policy
is known-or at least knowable-at the time of policy issuance by re-
viewing the coverage provided by the lower-level policies. 246 If the
amount of a reasonable settlement governed the excess insurer's at-
tachment point, the excess insurer would not be able to determine its
coverage obligations at the time of policy issuance, but instead might
not know its coverage obligations until many years later, when the pol-
icyholder has reached coverage settlements with the underlying
carriers.
Indeed, such a state of affairs would allow an excess insurer's cov-
erage obligations to be subject to the whims (within the bounds of a
reasonable settlement) of the policyholder in that the policyholder
unilaterally would be able to transfer obligations to the nonsettling
excess insurer through its release of underlying insurers. This is the
"hot potato" scenario described above, where a policyholder could co-
erce advantageous settlements by asserting an ability to impose per-
petual, first-dollar liability on any insurer it chooses by entering into
reasonable settlements that release all of the underlying coverage.247
This is hardly the sort of litigation dynamic the law should encourage,
particularly where, as here, such a rule would be contrary to the basis
upon which excess coverage is written. 248 For these reasons, an at-
tempt to require a nonsettling excess insurer to provide coverage ex-
cess of a below-limits settlement-instead of excess of the applicable
policy limits of the underlying policies-should be viewed for what it
is, an attempt to transfer obligations from the settling parties to the
nonsettling excess insurer. Moreover, the sophism that a reasonable
settlement of primary or lower-level coverage is a reasonable resolu-
that there is less likelihood that a higher-level excess policy will be implicated by the policy-
holder's liability. See Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Cont'l Nat'l Am. Ins. Co., 861 F.2d
1184, 1187 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that "[a]n excess insurer predicates the premiums it
charges upon the obligations that it and the primary insurer assume, including the primary
insurer's obligation to defend all suits until exhaustion of its liability limits.. . . Equity
cannot require [the excess insurer] to provide coverage for which it was not paid"); see also
supra note 57 (citing cases recognizing that excess policies are less expensive than primary
and lower-level excess policies because of their reduced risk of claims exposure).
246. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 752 N.E.2d 555, 568
(Ill. App. Ct. 2001). The court explained: "Excess or secondary insurance coverage is cov-
erage in which liability attaches under the policy only after a predetermined amount of pri-
mary coverage has been exhausted." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
247. See supra notes 167-171 and accompanying text (rejecting the policyholder's ability
to transfer perpetual liability to any excess insurer by settling with and releasing all under-
lying insurers).
248. Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Heddington Ins. Ltd., 883 F. Supp. 158, 163-64 n.11
(S.D. Tex. 1995), affjd mein., 84 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 1996).
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tion vis-a-vis a nonsettled excess insurer, just because it is reasonable
vis-a-vis the settling parties, is based on the fallacy that insurance cov-
erage disputes involve the policyholder versus a monolith of insurers,
when an excess insurer often has coverage interests that are diametri-
cally opposed to those of the underlying insurers.249 Therefore, it is
not reasonable to treat an underlying insurer as defacto representing
an excess insurer's reasonable interests in its settlement dealings with
the policyholder.25 °
The following examples will demonstrate why an excess insurer's
obligations should not begin until the policyholder's liability exceeds
the policy limits of underlying settled insurers lest the settling parties
transfer obligations from themselves to the nonsettled excess insurers.
One reason why a policyholder and its primary insurer settle an insur-
ance coverage dispute is because of questions as to whether the in-
surer has a valid coverage defense to the policyholder's claim.251
Imagine the case of a building contractor with a $1 million primary
policy and a $1 million excess policy issued for the same policy period.
The policyholder is sued by a building owner alleging that his build-
ing has been damaged because of the health hazards associated with
the policyholder's use of lead paint in the building many decades ago.
Assume that under the relevant case law, all of the alleged property
damage is treated as having taken place during the policy period in
which these two $1 million policies are in effect.
Assume further that the policyholder eventually settles with the
building owner for $1.5 million and then seeks coverage from its in-
surers. Because both of the insurance policies contain identical abso-
lute pollution exclusions, both insurers decline coverage and
litigation ensues. At the commencement of the litigation, the insurers
know that if their pollution exclusions apply, they owe the policy-
holder nothing; if their exclusions do not apply, the primary insurer
must pay the first $1 million of the policyholder's liability and the
excess insurer is liable for the remaining $500,000. However, courts
249. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text (asserting that primary or lower-level
excess insurers often have conflicting arguments with excess insurers in disputes with the
policyholder).
250. Indeed, the policyholder's settlement with some of its underlying insurers, without
settling with one or more excess insurers, does not advance the public interest in promot-
ing settlement of disputes because the policyholder still must litigate its claim against the
nonsettled excess insurers, who in all likelihood have the same or similar coverage de-
fenses as those of the settling insurers, with the nonsettling insurer also having a defense
that the underlying coverage is not exhausted. See Greenwald, supra note 115, at 560 (ex-
plaining why the policyholder's settlement with a primary insurer, but not with its excess
insurers, does not materially advance the public's interest in promoting settlement).
251. Seaman & Kittredge, supra note 5, at 708, 711-12.
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have come to opposite conclusions as to whether lead paint discharges
are necessarily excluded by the terms of a standard pollution exclu-
sion,252 meaning that both the primary insurer and the excess insurer
have potential coverage defenses.
In such a case, the policyholder and the primary insurer may set-
tle their differences based on the possibility that each might lose if the
applicability of the pollution exclusion were litigated.253 Assume the
policyholder and the primary insurer settle their coverage dispute for
$750,000, and the policyholder sought to require the excess insurer to
provide coverage for amounts in excess of the $750,000 settlement.
Given the uncertainty over whether the primary insurer's pollution
exclusion would bar coverage, the $750,000 settlement of the primary
insurer's coverage might be perfectly reasonable from the standpoint
of the policyholder and the primary insurer.
Nevertheless, even if this settlement were reasonable as between
the policyholder and its primary insurer, it is not reasonable to import
the terms of the primary insurer's settlement into the excess insurer's
policy by requiring the excess insurer to provide coverage for liability
in excess of the primary insurer's $750,000 settlement. Prior to the
primary insurer's settlement, the excess insurer either paid nothing
(if the insurers' pollution exclusion applied) or paid $500,000 (if the
exclusion did not apply). If, however, the excess insurer were re-
quired to provide coverage immediately excess of the primary in-
surer's settlement payment, it still would pay nothing if the pollution
exclusion applied, but now would be liable for $750,000 if the pollu-
tion exclusion did not apply. Thus, if the pollution exclusion ulti-
mately were found inapplicable, the primary insurer would have
received a $250,000 coverage discount because the insurers' pollution
exclusions provided a colorable coverage defense, but the excess in-
surer's exposure actually would have increased by $250,000 because the
insurers had a potential coverage defense.
In such a case, the policyholder and its primary insurer would
have every incentive to settle their dispute because they are simply
transferring their risk to the excess insurer. By settling, the primary
insurer gets a discount on its policy based on the existence of a colora-
252. Compare Sullins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 667 A.2d 617, 621-23 (Md. 1995) (holding that
the standard absolute pollution exclusion does not unambiguously exclude coverage for
lead paint-related bodily injury claims), with United States Liab. Ins. Co. v. Bourbeau, 49
F.3d 786, 787-89 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that the absolute pollution exclusion unambigu-
ously excludes coverage for lead paint-related property damage claims).
253. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text (noting that policyholders and insur-
ers frequently settle where the dispute concerns whether a particular claim is covered
under the insurer's policy).
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ble coverage defense. For its part, the policyholder gets a guaranteed
payment from the primary insurer regardless of how the coverage dis-
pute plays out, and would not have to fill any gap in coverage caused
by its below-limits settlement with the primary insurer. By contrast,
the excess insurer would see its coverage exposure increased by
$250,000 through no action of its own, based on the supposed ability
of the policyholder and its primary insurer to transfer the risks associ-
ated with their own settlement onto the nonsettling excess insurer.
It is for this reason that courts have recognized that the settling
parties, who have the ultimate control over their own settlement,
should be the ones who bear the risks associated with the terms of
their settlement. 254 If the policyholder settles with an underlying in-
surer for less than that underlying insurer's actual policy obligations,
whether through stupidity, bad luck, or in recognition that the set-
tling insurer has a potential coverage defense, the policyholder
should bear the consequences of its own conduct, and the conse-
quences of a below-limits settlement cannot be foisted upon an excess
insurer who had no role in the underlying settlement.255
A similar transfer of obligations occurs when the parties dispute
the applicability of policy limits. 256 Consider the case of a policy-
holder that has a primary policy and an excess policy in a given policy
period, each with a $1 million per occurrence limit and a $1 million
aggregate limit. The aggregate limits of both policies are written to
apply only to products hazard and completed operations hazard
claims. Assume that the policyholder faces 10,000 mass tort claims,
with the parties disputing whether the claims fall within the hazards to
which the policies' aggregate limits apply, and that there are no other
applicable coverage defenses. The policyholder eventually settles the
10,000 claims for $10,000 each, or a total of $100 million.257
254. See E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Lloyd's & Cos., 241 F.3d 154, 173 (2d Cir. 2001) (per
curiam) (setting forth that "[u]nder the court's approach, the settling parties are the ones
who took the risk of the settlement, and the non[-]settling parties are left precisely as they
would have been had no settlement occurred. That hardly seems unfair."); Koppers Co. v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 98 F.3d 1440, 1455 (3d Cir. 1996) (reasoning that "[tlhe beneficent
consequences of this formula are that the insured bears the risk of settling too low").
255. See Sec. Ins. Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., No. CV 960475565S, 1999 WL
545745, at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 12, 1999) (noting that a policyholder who settles with
and releases an insurer in effect elects to become self-insured for the coverage that would
have been provided by the settling insurer in the absence of the settlement and release).
256. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text (providing a litany of cases showing
that some courts hold that multiple asbestos claims arise out of a single occurrence while
others hold that multiple asbestos claims arise from multiple exposures).
257. Further assume that the policyholder either was authorized by its policies to settle
these claims, or that the insurers are not permitted to avoid coverage based on the policy-
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If the insurers' aggregate limits apply, the primary insurer's liabil-
ity is capped at $1 million, and the excess insurer's liability is capped
at $1 million. The remaining $98 million is the obligation of higher-
level excess insurers, or the obligation of the policyholder to the ex-
tent that the liability exceeds the available coverage for the policy pe-
riod. The same result would occur if all of the 10,000 claims against
the policyholder are held to arise out of a single occurrence,258 as the
primary insurer would be liable up to its $1 million per occurrence
limit, and the excess insurer's coverage would exhaust upon payment
of its own $1 million per occurrence limit. If, however, the insurers'
aggregate limits do not apply, and each claim is held to arise out of a
separate occurrence, then the primary insurer is liable for the entire
$100 million because no claim involves liability greater than the pri-
mary policy's per occurrence limit. Because the primary insurer's ob-
ligations would never exhaust under this scenario, the excess insurer
would pay nothing on these claims.
What happens, then, if the policyholder settles with its primary
insurer for $10 million, and then the court hearing the dispute be-
tween the policyholder and the excess insurer holds that the claims
are not subject to the insurers' aggregate limits, and that each claim
arises out of its own occurrence? In the absence of a settlement, the
primary insurer would have been obligated to pay the entire $100 mil-
lion, with the excess insurer having no liability. Nonetheless, if the
law in the relevant jurisdiction were unsettled, a $10 million settle-
ment between the policyholder and the primary insurer might be a
perfectly reasonable compromise.
If a court held that the excess insurer must provide excess cover-
age immediately excess to the amount of the primary insurer's reason-
able settlement, the excess insurer would be liable for $90 million
because its own aggregate limit and per occurrence limit would never
exhaust. That such a state of the law would constitute a transfer of
holder's settlement with the underlying tort claimants, and that all bodily injury occurred
during the relevant policy period.
258. Courts have held in some insurance coverage litigation concerning mass tort liabili-
ties that the policyholder's liability for thousands of products liability claims arise out of a
single occurrence-the policyholder's decision to become involved with the defective
product at issue. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (providing a series of cases all
holding that the underlying asbestos claims arise out of a single occurrence-the policy-
holder's decision to become involved with asbestos-containing products). On the other
hand, other courts have rejected this principle and held that each claimant's injuries arise
out of a separate occurrence. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (listing cases that




obligations from the primary insurer to the excess insurer is beyond
dispute.
Using the example described above, the policyholder and the pri-
mary insurer would be able to transfer $90 million in liability from the
primary insurer to the excess insurer by virtue of a private settlement
between the policyholder and primary insurer over which the excess
insurer had no control. With respect to the primary insurer's settle-
ment, the policyholder traded away its claim that the primary insurer
had perpetual, first-dollar liability for the 10,000 tort claims in return
for the payment of $10 million. However, if the policyholder then
were able to transfer to the excess insurer the consideration given by
the policyholder for the $10 million payment from the primary in-
surer (a released claim of perpetual, first-dollar coverage for the
claims at issue), the policyholder would have received $10 million
from the primary insurer for free, as any fallout from the policy-
holder's settlement with the primary insurer would be borne by the
excess insurer.259
Beyond being a naked transfer of obligations from the policy-
holder and its primary insurer to the excess insurer, imposing such
obligations on the excess insurer is fundamentally at odds with the
risks assumed by the excess insurer in issuing coverage to the policy-
holder.26 ° When an excess policy is written to apply excess of an un-
derlying primary policy, the excess insurer knows that its policy can
never incur the perpetual, first-dollar obligations that a primary in-
surer can face when claims arising out of multiple occurrences fall
outside the policies' aggregate limits.
261
The reason why an excess insurer does not face this threat is be-
cause its coverage attaches only upon exhaustion of the underlying
insurance. If a series of claims have the effect of exhausting the per
occurrence or aggregate coverage available under the primary policy,
259. The reason why this is true is that the policyholder, by settling with its primary
insurer, accepts an agreed-upon payment in return for giving away its claim that the pri-
mary insurer has perpetual, first-dollar liability for the underlying mass tort claims. If the
policyholder can then transfer this risk of perpetual, first-dollar liability to the excess in-
surer, the policyholder really has not given up anything in return for the $10 million be-
cause it could transfer its cost of settlement to the excess insurer.
260. Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Heddington Ins. Ltd., 883 F. Supp. 158, 163-64 n.lI
(S.D. Tex. 1995), affd mem., 84 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 1996).
261. See supra notes 167-168 and accompanying text (stating that where excess insurers
are liable only if the individual claim exceeds the primary policy's per occurrence limit, the
limits of the primary policy would never exhaust, and would be liable in perpetuity for each
claim up to the primary policy's per occurrence limit).
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the same will eventually occur under the excess policy.262 In such a
case, the excess insurer's first-dollar liability is temporary, lasting only
until such time as the claims exhaust the applicable limits of the ex-
cess policy. At that point, coverage obligations rest with the next-
lowest-layer excess policy, or with the policyholder if there is no fur-
ther excess coverage.263 On the other hand, if a series of claims do
not exhaust the underlying primary policy, the excess insurer never has
first-dollar liability because that obligation will remain with the
unexhausted primary policy.264 Thus, an attempt by a policyholder to
hold a nonsettled excess insurer liable, as a result of underlying settle-
ments, for perpetual, first-dollar coverage is nothing more than an
attempt to allow the policyholder's own settlements with other insur-
ers to impose upon the excess insurer a liability that it could never
incur in the absence of the policyholder's release of underlying insur-
ance coverage.
In holding that an excess insurer's coverage applies excess of the
actual limits of the underlying insurers, even if the underlying insur-
ers settled for less than their policy limits, courts have recognized that
it is unreasonable to allow the policyholder and its settling insurers
negatively to affect the coverage obligations of a nonsettled excess in-
surer.265 Because the policyholder has the ultimate control over the
terms of its settlements, the policyholder (and not the nonsettled ex-
cess insurer) should bear the risk of a below-limits settlement.2 66 It is,
after all, the policyholder who provides the release that eliminates the
settled insurers' coverage obligations.
Indeed, if a court simply accepted the views of the policyholder
and the settled insurer as to the coverage provided by the settled in-
surer's policy, the excess insurer's obligations would be held hostage
to the self-serving interpretations of the policyholder and the settled
insurer, both of whom have an incentive to minimize the coverage
available under the settled policy. The primary insurer has an incen-
tive to urge ajudicial interpretation that minimizes the coverage avail-
262. This conclusion assumes that there are no material differences in the application
of the per occurrence and aggregate limits between the primary policies and the excess
policies.
263. See, e.g., Feld v. Zale Corp., 62 F.3d 746, 749 n.1 (5th Cir. 1995).
264. Stargatt v. Fid. & Cas. Co., (D. Del. 1975), affd mem., 578 F.2d 1375 (3d Cir. 1978).
265. See Koppers Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 98 F.3d 1440, 1454 (3d Cir. 1996) (ex-
plaining that "by settling the policyholder loses any right to coverage of the difference
between the settlement amount and the primary policy's limits. The excess insurer cannot
be made liable for any part of this difference because the excess insurer never agreed to
pay for losses below a specified floor").
266. Sec. Ins. Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., No. CV 960475565S, 1999 AIL 545745,
at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 12, 1999).
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able under its policies for precedential reasons. The policyholder has
a similar incentive in order to avoid (or minimize) a gap in coverage
caused by a below-limits settlement. 67 The easiest way for a policy-
holder to avoid the entire problem of a below-limits settlement is to
convince the court that the underlying settlement amount was not less
than the settling insurer's actual policy obligations. That way, the pol-
icyholder need not litigate the legal effect of a below-limits settlement.
Because of this incentive, courts must permit the nonsettled excess
insurer to contest the policyholder's self-interested reading of the set-
tled policy, without a predisposition toward favoring the policy-
holder's proffered interpretation based on its status as a party to the
settled policy.
CONCLUSION
Ironically, the parties that originally pushed for, and obtained,
the policy limits set-off rule in cases such as Zeig and its progeny were
policyholders.268 Policyholders sought this rule in countering argu-
ments that an excess policy could not be implicated unless the policy-
holder actually collected from the underlying insurers amounts equal
to the excess insurer's attachment point, even if the policyholder's
overall liability clearly exceeded the excess insurer's attachment
point.269 The policyholders' basic argument was that such a rule
made sense in that the policyholder's settlement with its underlying
insurers would have no effect on the excess insurer's obligations.27 °
Now that this treatment of underlying settlements has become
widely accepted by courts, at least where the policyholder's actual obli-
gations exceed the excess insurer's attachment point,27' policyholders
267. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Dana Corp., 759 N.E.2d 1049, 1060 (Ind. 2001). In Dana, the
policyholder would not have a gap in coverage if the primary policies ultimately were
found to have aggregate limits, thus giving the policyholder an incentive to join with its
settled primary insurer in arguing for the existence of aggregate limits in the settled pri-
mary policies. Id. at 1059-60; see supra notes 200-211 (describing the rule that an excess
insurer is liable only when the policyholder's liabilities exceed the actual limits of the un-
derlying policies, even if the policyholder received less than such limits in underlying
settlements).
268. See Zeig v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 23 F.2d 665, 666 (2d Cir. 1928) (explaining




271. Compare supra notes 111-114 and accompanying text (discussing where the policy-
holder's actual obligations exceed the primary policy's limit), with supra notes 115-119
(demonstrating that where the policyholder's settlement of its tort liability results in the
tort plaintiffs agreement not to execute on a portion of the settlement amount, some
courts have held that the settlement amount does not represent the policyholder's true
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aggressively have sought to retreat from the Zeig rule in order to re-
quire nonsettling excess insurers to provide coverage immediately
above the amounts actually received from underlying insurers' settle-
ments. Of course, such a rule, if accepted, would pervert the entire
theoretical underpinning of Zeig and its progeny. Where the Zeig
rule's driving principle was that excess insurers should be no worse off
on account of the policyholder's settlement with its underlying insur-
ers, 2 7 2 policyholders today seek to hold excess insurers liable for
amounts they never would have to cover in the absence of settlements
by underlying insurers. 273 In some cases, policyholders even seek to
hold excess insurers perpetually liable for first-dollar coverage, con-
trary to the basic essence of excess coverage that the insurer is never
subject to such liability. 274
Fortunately, courts generally have rebuffed these blatant attempts
to transfer to an excess insurer the policyholder's cost of settling with
its underlying insurers. 27 5 Even in the context of so-called "modern"
insurance coverage litigation-with its attendant uncertainties as to
allocation of the policyholder's loss and the applicability of policy lim-
its-courts have held that an excess insurer is entitled to litigate with
its policyholder over the coverage that would have been available under
settled and released underlying policies.276 Only by vigorously enforc-
ing this principle can courts avoid converting relatively inexpensive
excess insurance into more valuable primary or lower-layer excess in-
surance in complete contravention of the premium structure under
which excess policies are sold.
liability and therefore cannot be used to determine whether the policyholder's liabilities
exceed the excess insurer's attachment point).
272. Zeig, 23 F.2d at 666.
273. See Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Heddington Ins. Ltd., 883 F. Supp. 158, 163-64 n.II
(S.D. Tex. 1995), affd mem., 84 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 1996).
274. See Marick, supra note 4, at 731 (stating that an excess insurer's duty to pay usually
only arises once the underlying policy is exhausted).
275. See, e.g., E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Lloyd's & Cos., 241 F.3d 154, 173 (2d Cir. 2001)
(per curiam).
276. See Bower, supra note 12, at 538-43 (canvassing cases that allow excess insurers to
litigate this issue).
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